Hi Josh, It is similar but slightly different IMHO.
Section 4.6.4 of the RFC6819 is the access token phishing by a counterfeit resource server. The mix-up attack described here is the code phishing by a counterfeit token endpoint. In my view, both can be mitigated by the server returning the next step: i.e., authorization endpoint returning the legitimate token endpoint uri, and token endpoint returning legitimate resource endpoint uris. This involves no discovery endpoint, which is good. Your way also works. It is just the reverse of my proposal. The difference being that my proposal does not need any coding on the server but just configuration, and it can return more metadata if needed. Cheers, Nat 2016年1月21日(木) 23:04 Josh Mandel <jman...@gmail.com>: > Apologies if this is the wrong forum for my comment (and please direct me > to the appropriate place in that case), but I have two questions about the > propose mitigation (and the thinking behind it) that I think the write-up > could address: > > 1. Could the writeup clarify whether/how the primary "mixup" threat > differs from what RFC6819 identifies as in section 4.6.4? > > 2. Has the workgroup considered a mitigation that puts more responsibility > on the authorization server, and less on the client? For example, if would > be helpful for the writeup to clarify why having the client send an > "audience field" (in the terminology of RFC6819) to the authorization > endpoint would not mitigate the threat. (In that scenario, the > authorization server can recognize that the audience does not correspond to > a resource server it knows, rather than asking clients to make this check). > I assume this approach has been considered and rejected as an incomplete > mitigation, but I don't have visibility into where/how that discussion > went. > > Thanks, > > Josh > Hi all, > > this is the call for adoption of OAuth 2.0 Mix-Up Mitigation, see > https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-oauth-mix-up-mitigation-00 > > Please let us know by Feb 9th whether you accept / object to the > adoption of this document as a starting point for work in the OAuth > working group. > > Note: This call is related to the announcement made on the list earlier > this month, see > http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg15336.html. More > time for analysis is provided due to the complexity of the topic. > > Ciao > Hannes & Derek > > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >
_______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
