The reason is simple: to benefit from the rest of the improvements in
the OAuth2 framework. These are just the ones off the top of my head:
1) Multiple means for getting a token (all the flows are now available)
2) No request tokens
3) No reliance on per-client secrets (though, addendum, I think the MAC
spec should be augmented to use them if present)
4) Ability to integrate with many different extensions to OAuth2, both
now and in the future
-- Justin
On 08/10/2012 12:18 PM, Dick Hardt wrote:
As an implementor, I would pick a signed JWT over OAuth 1.0A. Just saying.
Given that, there is also a clear need for signing an HTTP(S) request as some
sites are choosing OAuth 1.0A over OAuth 2.0 because they don't want to use
bearer tokens.
I never followed what MAC solved that OAuth 1.0A did not solve. Would someone
elaborate? We do have an RFC for signing requests, there are lots of libraries
already. Why the desire to reinvent OAuth 1.0A?
-- Dick
On Aug 10, 2012, at 8:00 AM, Rob Richards wrote:
I think you nailed it which that statement. Up until now it as been back and
forth about one or the other. Personally I prefer to used layered security and
not relying on a single point of attack. It's unrealistic to say everyone is
going to want/need/be able to use (take your pick) signed/encrypted JWT. MAC at
least offers an alternative, less complicated solution.
Rob
On 8/10/12 10:41 AM, Richer, Justin P. wrote:
What about security in depth? Signing + TLS is more secure than either alone,
isn't it?
-- Justin
On Aug 10, 2012, at 3:01 AM, Hannes Tschofenig wrote:
Hi Bill,
thanks for the feedback. Let's have a look at this use case:
You need to provide me a bit more information regarding your use case. Could
you please explain
1) Who is authenticated to whom?
2) What plaintext connection are you talking about?
3) What is the problem with encrypted connections? Is this again the "TLS has so bad
performance" argument?
4) Since you are talking about cookies and making them more secure are you
trying to come up with a general solution to better cookie security - a topic
others are working on as well.
5) What is the threat you are concerned about?
Ciao
Hannes
PS: I would heavily argue against standardize a security mechanism that offers weaker
protection than bearer when the entire argument has always been "Bearer is so
insecure and we need something stronger."
On Aug 9, 2012, at 9:43 PM, William Mills wrote:
OK, I'll play and start documenting the use cases.
Use case #1: Secure authentication in plain text connections:
Some applications need a secure form authorization, but do not want or need the
overhead of encrypted connections. HTTP cookies and their ilk are replayable
credentials and do not satisfy this need. the MAC scheme using signed HTTP
authorization credentials offer the capability to securely authorize a
transaction, can offer integrity protection on all or part of an HTTP request,
and can provide replay protection.
-bill
From: John Bradley <ve7...@ve7jtb.com>
To: William Mills <wmills_92...@yahoo.com>
Cc: Dick Hardt <dick.ha...@gmail.com>; "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
Sent: Thursday, August 9, 2012 11:26 AM
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] mistake in draft-ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac-01
In Vancouver the question was asked about the future of the MAC spec due to it
no linger having a editor.
The Chair and AD indicated a desire to have a document on the use-cases we are
trying to address before deciding on progressing MAC or starting a new document.
Phil Hunt is going to put together a summery of the Vancouver discussion and we
are going to work on the use-case/problem description document ASAP.
People are welcome to contribute to the use-case document.
Part of the problem with MAC has been that people could never agree on what it
was protecting against.
I think there is general agreement that one or more proof mechanisms are
required for access tokens.
Security for the token endpoint also cannot be ignored.
John B.
On 2012-08-09, at 1:53 PM, William Mills wrote:
MAC fixes the signing problems encountered in OAuth 1.0a, yes there are
libraries out there for OAuth 1.0a. MAC fits in to the OAuth 2 auth model and
will provide for a single codepath for sites that want to use both Bearer and
MAC.
From: Dick Hardt <dick.ha...@gmail.com>
To: William Mills <wmills_92...@yahoo.com>
Cc: "oauth@ietf.org" <oauth@ietf.org>
Sent: Thursday, August 9, 2012 10:27 AM
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] mistake in draft-ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac-01
On Aug 9, 2012, at 9:52 AM, William Mills wrote:
I find the idea of starting from scratch frustrating. MAC solves a set of
specific problems and has a well defined use case. It's symmetric key based
which doesn't work for some folks, and the question is do we try to develop
something that supports both PK and SK, or finish the SK use case and then work
on a PK based draft.
I think it's better to leave them separate and finish out MAC which is *VERY
CLOSE* to being done.
Who is interested in MAC? People can use OAuth 1.0 if they prefer that model.
For my projects, I prefer the flexibility of a signed or encrypted JWT if I
need holder of key.
Just my $.02
-- Dick
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