My proposal is to remove any reference to registration (which is a red herring and has raised all the problems we refer here) and refer to client authentication instead.
Proposal: "Clients may be implemented as a distributed set of components that run in different security contexts. For instance, a single client may include a webserver component and a script component in a browser. It is not appropriate for the different components to utilize the same client authentication mechanisms, since client authentication credentials that are held securely in one context cannot be deployed securely in another. Servers MUST mitigate security threats from client components that cannot hold client credentials as securely by distinguishing them from client components that can. Example of suitable measures are: - Requiring separate registration of components such as web server and a mobile application. - Restricting the time validity of tokens issued to clients that hold no authentication credentials, such as browser script-based components." Please don't truncate explanations in the interest of space if the resulting text is confusing and possibly misleading. Better to say nothing instead. On Thu, Mar 15, 2012 at 11:32, Eran Hammer <e...@hueniverse.com> wrote: > Here are the facts: > > The authorization server must know the client type in order to enforce many > of the requirements in the specification. > The requirement to provide a client type is not decorated with a MUST or > SHALL but that is implied. > The specification only defines two client types: public and confidential. > There is no client type defined for a hybrid client. > The specification needs to address the very common use case of clients with > both public and private components. > > I don't want to discuss in the specification how client identifiers are > provisioned, nor do I want to discuss the potential binding of response > types to client types. But we do need to provide some guidance to clients > and authorization servers what to do with clients that do not fit the > current type definitions. > > It is far too late for us to define a new client type, along with all the > security considerations that such type imply. Our entire security > consideration section and protocol design are based on have a well defined > client type. > > Requiring separate registration for each component is the most > straight-forward solution. Allowing the authorization server to offer > alternatives is the backdoor to enable extensibility. > > Within these constraints, I am open to other prose or creative solutions. > But the add-ons proposed are all ugly hacks. They clarify specific questions > raised which I do not believe represent the core confusion here which is > what is the right way to handle hybrid clients. > > The best way to move forward is to take a minute and ask the group to share > how they handle such cases or how they think they should be handled. Based > on that we can come up with a clear solution. > > EH > > From: Breno de Medeiros <br...@google.com> > Date: Thu, 15 Mar 2012 09:56:13 -0700 > To: Eran Hammer-Lahav <e...@hueniverse.com> > Cc: Nat Sakimura <sakim...@gmail.com>, OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org> > > Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fw: Breaking change in OAuth 2.0 rev. 23 > > > > On Thu, Mar 15, 2012 at 07:45, Eran Hammer <e...@hueniverse.com> wrote: >> >> This add-on is unnecessary. It already says the authorization server can >> handle it any way it wants. The fact that other registration options are >> possible clearly covers the client identifier reuse case. As for the >> response type, that’s not an issue but more of an optimization for an edge >> case raised. > > > It still feels like a horse by committee to me. "unless the > authorization server provides other registration options to specify such > complex clients." seems a very round about way to say that the core spec > already provides for such arrangements in the most common scenario. It is a > bit of a stretch to say that the server provides "other registration > options" by simply following strategy already laid out in the spec. > > In particular, I feel that this wording will be harmful to register extended > behavior, e.g., alternative response_types by leading to fruitless > conversations about spec compliance in the absence of real security risks. > > I do not believe the current text is the best representation of the spirit > in which the spec was written (in particular the effort to specify two flows > in detail to deal with precisely this issue) and possibly lead to harmful > future interpretation. > >> >> >> >> EH >> >> >> >> From: oauth-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of >> Nat Sakimura >> Sent: Thursday, March 15, 2012 2:04 AM >> To: Breno de Medeiros; OAuth WG >> >> >> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fw: Breaking change in OAuth 2.0 rev. 23 >> >> >> >> >> >> So, Eran's first proposal: >> >> >> >> A client application consisting of multiple components, each with its >> own client type (e.g. a distributed client with both a confidential >> server-based component and a public browser-based component), MUST >> register each component separately as a different client to ensure >> >> proper handling by the authorization server, unless the authorization >> server provides other registration options to specify such complex >> clients. >> >> >> >> kind of meets my concern. There seems to be another issue around the >> usefulness of return_type in such case raised by Breno, and if I understand >> it correctly, Eran's answer was that these separate components may have the >> same client_id so that return_type is a valid parameter to be sent at the >> request. >> >> >> >> So, to clarify these, perhaps changing the above text slightly to the >> following solves the problem? >> >> >> >> A client application consisting of multiple components, each with its >> own client type (e.g. a distributed client with both a confidential >> server-based component and a public browser-based component), MUST >> register each component separately as a different client to ensure >> >> proper handling by the authorization server, unless the authorization >> server provides other registration options to specify such complex >> clients. >> >> Each component MAY have the same client_id, in which case the server >> >> judges the client type and the associated security context based on >> the response_type parameter in the request. >> >> >> >> Would it solve your problem, Breno? >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> >> >> =nat >> >> > > > > > -- > --Breno -- --Breno _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
