Here are the facts: 1. The authorization server must know the client type in order to enforce many of the requirements in the specification. 2. The requirement to provide a client type is not decorated with a MUST or SHALL but that is implied. 3. The specification only defines two client types: public and confidential. There is no client type defined for a hybrid client. 4. The specification needs to address the very common use case of clients with both public and private components.
I don't want to discuss in the specification how client identifiers are provisioned, nor do I want to discuss the potential binding of response types to client types. But we do need to provide some guidance to clients and authorization servers what to do with clients that do not fit the current type definitions. It is far too late for us to define a new client type, along with all the security considerations that such type imply. Our entire security consideration section and protocol design are based on have a well defined client type. Requiring separate registration for each component is the most straight-forward solution. Allowing the authorization server to offer alternatives is the backdoor to enable extensibility. Within these constraints, I am open to other prose or creative solutions. But the add-ons proposed are all ugly hacks. They clarify specific questions raised which I do not believe represent the core confusion here which is what is the right way to handle hybrid clients. The best way to move forward is to take a minute and ask the group to share how they handle such cases or how they think they should be handled. Based on that we can come up with a clear solution. EH From: Breno de Medeiros <br...@google.com<mailto:br...@google.com>> Date: Thu, 15 Mar 2012 09:56:13 -0700 To: Eran Hammer-Lahav <e...@hueniverse.com<mailto:e...@hueniverse.com>> Cc: Nat Sakimura <sakim...@gmail.com<mailto:sakim...@gmail.com>>, OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org<mailto:oauth@ietf.org>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fw: Breaking change in OAuth 2.0 rev. 23 On Thu, Mar 15, 2012 at 07:45, Eran Hammer <e...@hueniverse.com<mailto:e...@hueniverse.com>> wrote: This add-on is unnecessary. It already says the authorization server can handle it any way it wants. The fact that other registration options are possible clearly covers the client identifier reuse case. As for the response type, that’s not an issue but more of an optimization for an edge case raised. It still feels like a horse by committee to me. "unless the authorization server provides other registration options to specify such complex clients." seems a very round about way to say that the core spec already provides for such arrangements in the most common scenario. It is a bit of a stretch to say that the server provides "other registration options" by simply following strategy already laid out in the spec. In particular, I feel that this wording will be harmful to register extended behavior, e.g., alternative response_types by leading to fruitless conversations about spec compliance in the absence of real security risks. I do not believe the current text is the best representation of the spirit in which the spec was written (in particular the effort to specify two flows in detail to deal with precisely this issue) and possibly lead to harmful future interpretation. EH From: oauth-boun...@ietf.org<mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org> [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org<mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org>] On Behalf Of Nat Sakimura Sent: Thursday, March 15, 2012 2:04 AM To: Breno de Medeiros; OAuth WG Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Fw: Breaking change in OAuth 2.0 rev. 23 So, Eran's first proposal: A client application consisting of multiple components, each with its own client type (e.g. a distributed client with both a confidential server-based component and a public browser-based component), MUST register each component separately as a different client to ensure proper handling by the authorization server, unless the authorization server provides other registration options to specify such complex clients. kind of meets my concern. There seems to be another issue around the usefulness of return_type in such case raised by Breno, and if I understand it correctly, Eran's answer was that these separate components may have the same client_id so that return_type is a valid parameter to be sent at the request. So, to clarify these, perhaps changing the above text slightly to the following solves the problem? A client application consisting of multiple components, each with its own client type (e.g. a distributed client with both a confidential server-based component and a public browser-based component), MUST register each component separately as a different client to ensure proper handling by the authorization server, unless the authorization server provides other registration options to specify such complex clients. Each component MAY have the same client_id, in which case the server judges the client type and the associated security context based on the response_type parameter in the request. Would it solve your problem, Breno? Best, =nat -- --Breno
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