Nat and I just refreshed the I-D for draft-sakimura-oauth-requrl. It is essentially a standardization of the method we are using in openID Connect to make signed requests to the Authorization server.
We do have the issue that parameters in the signed/encrypted request necessarily duplicate the query parameters to keep it a valid OAuth request plus an extension. Even if it doesn't wind up as a OAuth WG item it is probably worth people looking at it before the final openID spec is voted on. Regards John B. On 2011-10-26, at 3:16 PM, Torsten Lodderstedt wrote: > Hi Nat, > > I think your proposal would be a useful OAuth enhancement. A JSON-based > request format would allow for more complex requests (e.g. carrying resource > server URLs and corresponding scope values ;-)). > > Please note: I also think the way this mechanism is introduced and used in > the current OpenID connect spec requires OpenID connect clients and servers > to handle OAuth request parameters differently than for standard OAuth > requests. Introducing the JSON based claim request capability to OAuth would > be a way to cope with this. > > regards, > Torsten. > > Am 22.10.2011 16:00, schrieb Nat Sakimura: >> >> Hi. >> >> Just a clarification: >> >> Although my expired draft is 'request by reference', what was proposed >> through it at the iiw really is a generalized JSON based claim request >> capability. It could be passed by value as JSON or could be passed by >> reference. The later is an optimization for bandwidth constrained network as >> well as strengthening security in some ways. This capability already exists >> in OpenID Connect but it is actually an underpinning transport, so it >> probably should belong to OAuth instead. This was the primary reason for the >> proposal. >> >> Nat >> >> On Thu, Oct 20, 2011 at 3:56 PM, Torsten Lodderstedt >> <tors...@lodderstedt.net> wrote: >> Hi all, >> >> my prioritization is driven by the goal to make OAuth the authorization >> framework of choice for any internet standard protocol, such as WebDAV, >> IMAP, SMTP or SIP. So let me first explain what is missing from my point of >> view and explain some thoughts how to fill the gaps. >> >> A standard protocol is defined in terms of resource types and messages by a >> body (e.g. IETF, OIDF, OMA), (hopefully) implemented in many places, and >> used by different but deployment-independent clients. OAuth-based protocol >> specifications must also define scope values (e.g. read, write, send) and >> their relation to the resource types and messages. The different deployments >> expose the standard protocol on different resource server endpoints. In my >> opinion, it is fundamental to clearly distinguish scope values >> (standardized, static) and resource server addresses (deployment specific) >> and to manage their relationships. The current scope definition is much to >> weak and insufficient. Probably, the UMA concepts of hosts, resources sets, >> and corresponding scopes could be adopted for that purpose. >> >> OAuth today requires clients to register with the service provider before >> they are deployed. Would you really expect IMAP clients, e.g. Thunderbird, >> to register with any a-Mail services upfront? So clients should be given a >> way to register dynamically to the authorization servers. This should also >> allow us to cover "client instance" aspects. It is interesting to note, that >> such a mechanism would allow us to get rid of secret-less clients and the >> one-time usage requirement for authorization codes. >> >> We also assume the client to know the URLs of the resource server and the >> corresponding authorization server and to use HTTPS server authentication to >> verify the resource server's authenticity. This is impossible in the >> standard scenario. Clients must be able to discover the authorization server >> a particular resource server relies on at runtime. The discovery mechanism >> could be specified by the OAuth WG, but could also be part of an application >> protocols specification. But we MUST find another way to prevent token >> phishing by counterfeit resource servers. >> >> As one approach, the client could pass the (previously HTTPS validated) >> resource server's URL with the authorization request. The authorization >> server should then refuse such requests for any unknown (counterfeit) >> resource servers. Such an additional parameter could also serve as namespace >> for scope values and enable service providers to run multiple instances of >> the same service within a single deployment. >> >> If the additional data enlarges the request payload to much, we could >> consider to adopt the "request by reference" proposal. >> >> Let's now assume, OAuth is successful in the world of standard protocols and >> we will see plenty of deployments with a bunch of different OAuth protected >> resource servers. Shall this servers all be accessible with a single token? >> In my opinion, this would cause security, privacy and/or >> scalability/performance problems. To give just the most obvious example, the >> target audience of such a token cannot be restricted enough, which may allow >> a resource server (or an attacker in control of it) to abuse the token on >> other servers. But the current design of the code grant type forces >> deployments to use the same token for all services. What is needed from my >> point of view is a way to request and issue multiple server-specific access >> tokens with a single authorization process. >> >> I've been advocating this topic for a long time now and I'm still convinced >> this is required to really complete the core design. We at Deutsche Telekom >> needed and implemented this function on top of the existing core. In my >> opinion, a core enhancement would be easier to handle and more powerful. If >> others support this topic, I would be willed to submit an I-D describing a >> possible solution. >> >> If we take standards really seriously, then service providers should be >> given the opportunity to implement their service by utilizing standard >> server implementations. This creates the challenge to find a standardized >> protocol between authorization server and resource server to exchange >> authorization data. Depending on the token design (self-contained vs. >> handle) this could be solved by either standardizing a token format (JWT) or >> an authorization API. >> >> Based on the rationale given above, my list is as follows (topics w/o I-D >> are marked with *): >> >> - Revocation (low hanging fruit since I-D is ready and implemented in some >> places) >> - Resource server notion* >> - Multiple access tokens* >> - Dynamic client registration >> >> 1) Dynamic Client Registration Protocol >> 4) Client Instance Extension >> - Discovery >> (10) Simple Web Discovery, probably other specs as well >> - (6) JSON Web Token >> - (7) JSON Web Token (JWT) Bearer Profile >> - 8) User Experience Extension >> - Device flow >> - 9) Request by Reference >> (depending resource server notion and multiple access tokens) >> >> regards, >> Torsten. >> Zitat von Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofe...@gmx.net>: >> >> >> Hi all, >> >> in preparation of the upcoming IETF meeting Barry and I would like to start >> a re-chartering discussion. We both are currently attending the Internet >> Identity Workshop and so we had the chance to solicit input from the >> participants. This should serve as a discussion starter. >> >> Potential future OAuth charter items (in random order): >> >> ---------------- >> >> 1) Dynamic Client Registration Protocol >> >> Available document: >> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hardjono-oauth-dynreg/ >> >> 2) Token Revocation >> >> Available document: >> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-lodderstedt-oauth-revocation/ >> >> 3) UMA >> >> Available document: >> http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hardjono-oauth-umacore/ >> >> 4) Client Instance Extension >> >> Available document: >> http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-richer-oauth-instance-00.txt >> >> 5) XML Encoding >> >> Available document: >> http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-richer-oauth-xml-00.txt >> >> 6) JSON Web Token >> >> Available document: >> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-json-web-token-05 >> >> 7) JSON Web Token (JWT) Bearer Profile >> >> Available document: >> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-oauth-jwt-bearer-00 >> >> 8) User Experience Extension >> >> Available document: >> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-recordon-oauth-v2-ux-00 >> >> 9) Request by Reference >> >> Available document: >> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sakimura-oauth-requrl-00 >> >> 10) Simple Web Discovery >> >> Available document: >> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-simple-web-discovery-00 >> >> ---------------- >> >> We have the following questions: >> >> a) Are you interested in any of the above-listed items? (as a reviewer, >> co-author, implementer, or someone who would like to deploy). It is also >> useful to know if you think that we shouldn't work on a specific item. >> >> b) Are there other items you would like to see the group working on? >> >> Note: In case your document is expired please re-submit it. >> >> Ciao >> Hannes & Barry >> >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list >> OAuth@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list >> OAuth@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >> >> >> >> -- >> Nat Sakimura (=nat) >> Chairman, OpenID Foundation >> http://nat.sakimura.org/ >> @_nat_en >> > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
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