Don't install crap on you device or computer. OAuth is the least of your concern if you install bad software.
If there was a solution to this we would not need an antivirus. EHL On Sep 6, 2011, at 11:23, "Michael Thomas" <m...@mtcc.com> wrote: > Eran Hammer-Lahav wrote: >> I agree. If you are going to install a native app, you better trust it not >> to do bad things. Grabbing your password is the least interesting thing such >> an app can abuse. I don't see any need to change the v2 draft. > > How, exactly, is the user supposed to protect themselves against rogue apps? > It sounds like the solution is to tell them to never use oauth in an app at > all. > > Is oauth only intended to be used on standalone trustable web browsers? I > don't recall > seeing that anywhere. > > Mike > >> >> EHL >> >> On Sep 6, 2011, at 11:10, "Igor Faynberg" <igor.faynb...@alcatel-lucent.com> >> wrote: >> >>> Mike, >>> >>> You've got the problem statement right: allowing the user to authorize >>> resource access to another party without divulging user's credentials is >>> the objective of OAuth. You are also right in that the attack you have >>> described defies the whole purpose of OAuth. I do not think though that >>> it is related to OAuth per se. >>> >>> To this end, the security work led by Torsten has thoroughly analyzed >>> the protocol and specified protection against multiple protocol >>> attacks. From what you described, it appears to me that the attack you >>> mention is not related to the protocol but rather to the user's >>> environment. There is no possible protection from key loggers that a >>> protocol can implement. I could be mistaken; in any case, it looks like >>> the problem rests with the implementation of WebView. >>> >>> If I am wrong, I would appreciate a detailed description of what happened. >>> >>> Igor >>> >>> On 9/6/2011 1:40 PM, Michael Thomas wrote: >>>> Hi all, >>>> >>>> Barry suggested that I might subscribe and explain what I sent him. >>>> >>>> My basic problem is that in neither the protocol nor the threats drafts, >>>> I can't seem to find what problem is actually trying to be solved with >>>> oauth, and what assumptions you're making about various elements. >>>> >>>> Here's what I did. I've written an app, and I wanted re-integrate the >>>> ability to send tweets after they deprecated Basic. So the app has a >>>> webView (android, iphone...) which it obviously completely controls. >>>> With oauth, the webview UA will ultimately redirect off to Twitter's >>>> site to collect the user's credentials and grant my app's backend an >>>> access token (sorry if I get terminology screwed up, i'm just coming >>>> up to speed). >>>> >>>> What occurs to me is that webview affords exactly zero protection from >>>> my client (ie, the app) from getting the user's twitter credentials. All >>>> I have to do is set up a keypress handler on that webview and in a few >>>> minutes of hacking I have a key logger. etc. >>>> >>>> So what I can't tell is whether this is a "problem" or not, because I >>>> don't know what problem you're trying to solve. If the object of oauth >>>> isn't to keep user/server credentials out of the hands of a third party, >>>> then what is it trying to solve? Is there an expectation that the >>>> UA is trusted by the user/server? What happens when that's not the case? >>>> >>>> Regardless of whether I'm misunderstanding, it would sure be nice to have >>>> both the problem and your assumptions laid out, hopefully with some >>>> prominence >>>> so you don't get these sort of dumb questions. >>>> >>>> Mike >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> OAuth mailing list >>>> OAuth@ietf.org >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>> _______________________________________________ >>> OAuth mailing list >>> OAuth@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list >> OAuth@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
