I think that any signature method that we end up using needs to rely
less on magic and anecdote and more on explicit declaration.
This is certainly correct ...
I think
that Brian Eaton's approach of sending the bare string that was
signed,
which was also a JSON element that could be parsed and validated,
was an
essential simplification.
... but this does not follow. The signer can specify what was signed
without sending the data...
Even OpenID states which of the parameters on
the request were signed, which makes it easier to validate.
... as in this pattern. There are some other examples of elements of
the signed object being conditionally included:
1. HTTP Digest authentication [1]
2. The IKEv2 key exchange messages [2]
As has been pointed out before, there is a security risk in sending
the signed request data itself (as opposed to metadata that allows the
recipient to reconstruct the data), because the recipient can choose
not to verify the binding between the signed data and the request.
--Richard
[1] <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2617#section-3.2.2>
[2] <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4306#section-1.2>
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