This is probably a stupid question, but why do we need accurate timestamps? Why is it not sufficient to use a monotonically increasing call_id to prevent replay attacks? (this is how the Facebook sig algorithm works)
On Mar 24, 2010, at 9:28 PM, Raffi Krikorian wrote: but timestamps are still necessary in the signature method? On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 7:31 PM, Allen Tom <a...@yahoo-inc.com<mailto:a...@yahoo-inc.com>> wrote: In our experience at Yahoo, we’ve found that many clients don’t have the right time. You’d think that NTP would have solved this by now, but it hasn’t for a surprising number of clients. Are timestamps really necessary in Oauth 2.0? In OAuth 1.0a, timestamps are included in the signature to protect against replay attacks. This is not really necessary in Oauth 2.0 since signatures are optional when SSL is used. Allen On 3/24/10 6:26 PM, "Paul Lindner" <lind...@inuus.com<http://lind...@inuus.com/>> wrote: Right now if a client with an inaccurate clock makes an OAuth call they are rejected. OAuth Problem Reporting <http://oauth.pbworks.com/ProblemReporting> includes a mechanism to send the server's concept of 'now' to the client: The parameter named oauth_acceptable_timestamps consists of two numbers in decimal notation, separated by '-' (hyphen). It's the range of timestamps acceptable to the sender. That is, it means the sender will currently accept an oauth_timestamp that's not less than the first number and not greater than the second number. With that data a client can maintain a time skew value to translate localized time to the server's (reliable) time. We've found that this problem is more widespread than I would have imagined. _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth -- Raffi Krikorian Twitter Platform Team http://twitter.com/raffi
_______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth