On Jan 11, 2015, at 15:28 , Colin Johnston <col...@gt86car.org.uk> wrote:
> 
> unfortunately chinanet antispam/abuse email box is always full, after a while 
> people block .
> always check arin/ripe for known good provider blocks and actively exclude 
> from rules

They aren't the only ones who never reply to abuse@.


> ddos protection via careful overview ips rules and active web source ip 
> monitoring works well, the hard part is daily rule updates and blocks until 
> you know most traffic is genuine.

No one is advocating "never block anything".

However, automatic blocking based on a single DNS packet to a non-DNS server is 
.. let's call it counterproductive.

Good hygiene is necessary both on outgoing packets and on blocking. Checking 
ARIN/RIPE (not APNIC, LACNIC, AFRINIC?) is not even the bare minimum you should 
be doing.

-- 
TTFN,
patrick


>> On 11 Jan 2015, at 19:42, "Patrick W. Gilmore" <patr...@ianai.net> wrote:
>> 
>> I do love solutions which open larger attack surfaces than they are supposed 
>> to close. In the US, we call that "a cure worse than the disease".
>> 
>> Send packet from random bot with source of Google, Comcast, Akamai, etc. to 
>> Mr. Hammett's not-DNS / honeypot / whatever, and watch him close himself off 
>> from the world.
>> 
>> VoilĂ ! Denial of service accomplished without all the hassle of sending 100s 
>> of Gbps of traffic.
>> 
>> Best part is he was willing to explain this to 10,000+ of his not-so-closest 
>> friends, in a search-engine-indexed manner.
>> 
>> -- 
>> TTFN,
>> patrick
>> 
>>> On Jan 11, 2015, at 14:34 , Phil Bedard <bedard.p...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Many attacks can use spoofed source IPs, so who are you really blocking?  
>>> 
>>> That's why BCP38 as mentioned many times already is a necessary tool in 
>>> fighting the attacks overall.  
>>> 
>>> Phil 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> On 1/11/15, 4:33 PM, "Mike Hammett" <na...@ics-il.net> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> I didn't necessarily think I was shattering minds with my ideas. 
>>>> 
>>>> I don't have the time to read a dozen presentations. 
>>>> 
>>>> Blackhole them and move on. I don't care whose feelings I hurt. This 
>>>> isn't kindergarten. Maybe "you" should have tried a little harder to not 
>>>> get a virus in the first place. Quit clicking on male enhancement ads or 
>>>> update your OS occasionally. I'm not going to spend a bunch of time and 
>>>> money to make sure someone's bubble of bliss doesn't get popped. Swift, 
>>>> effective, cheap. Besides, you're only cut off for 30 days. If in 30 days 
>>>> you can prove yourself to be responsible, we can try this again. Well, 
>>>> that or a sufficient support request. 
>>>> 
>>>> Besides, if enough people did hat, the list of blackholes wouldn't be 
>>>> huge as someone upstream already blocked them. 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> ----- 
>>>> Mike Hammett 
>>>> Intelligent Computing Solutions 
>>>> http://www.ics-il.com 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>>> 
>>>> From: "Roland Dobbins" <rdobb...@arbor.net> 
>>>> To: nanog@nanog.org 
>>>> Sent: Sunday, January 11, 2015 9:29:33 AM 
>>>> Subject: Re: DDOS solution recommendation 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>>> On 11 Jan 2015, at 22:21, Mike Hammett wrote: 
>>>>> 
>>>>> I'm not saying what you're doing is wrong, I'm saying whatever the 
>>>>> industry as a whole is doing obviously isn't working and perhaps a 
>>>>> different approach is required.
>>>> 
>>>> You haven't recommended anything new, and you really need to do some 
>>>> reading in order to understand why it isn't as simple as you seem to 
>>>> think it is. 
>>>> 
>>>>> Security teams? My network has me, myself and I.
>>>> 
>>>> And a relatively small network, too. 
>>>> 
>>>>> If for example ChinaNet's abuse department isn't doing anything about 
>>>>> complains, eventually their whole network gets blocked a /32 at a 
>>>>> time. *shrugs* Their loss.
>>>> 
>>>> Again, it isn't that simple. 
>>>> 
>>>> ----------------------------------- 
>>>> Roland Dobbins <rdobb...@arbor.net>
>> 

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