unfortunately chinanet antispam/abuse email box is always full, after a while 
people block .
always check arin/ripe for known good provider blocks and actively exclude from 
rules



ddos protection via careful overview ips rules and active web source ip 
monitoring works well, the hard part is daily rule updates and blocks until you 
know most traffic is genuine.

colin

Sent from my iPhone

> On 11 Jan 2015, at 19:42, "Patrick W. Gilmore" <patr...@ianai.net> wrote:
> 
> I do love solutions which open larger attack surfaces than they are supposed 
> to close. In the US, we call that "a cure worse than the disease".
> 
> Send packet from random bot with source of Google, Comcast, Akamai, etc. to 
> Mr. Hammett's not-DNS / honeypot / whatever, and watch him close himself off 
> from the world.
> 
> VoilĂ ! Denial of service accomplished without all the hassle of sending 100s 
> of Gbps of traffic.
> 
> Best part is he was willing to explain this to 10,000+ of his not-so-closest 
> friends, in a search-engine-indexed manner.
> 
> -- 
> TTFN,
> patrick
> 
>> On Jan 11, 2015, at 14:34 , Phil Bedard <bedard.p...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>> Many attacks can use spoofed source IPs, so who are you really blocking?  
>> 
>> That's why BCP38 as mentioned many times already is a necessary tool in 
>> fighting the attacks overall.  
>> 
>> Phil 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> On 1/11/15, 4:33 PM, "Mike Hammett" <na...@ics-il.net> wrote:
>>> 
>>> I didn't necessarily think I was shattering minds with my ideas. 
>>> 
>>> I don't have the time to read a dozen presentations. 
>>> 
>>> Blackhole them and move on. I don't care whose feelings I hurt. This 
>>> isn't kindergarten. Maybe "you" should have tried a little harder to not 
>>> get a virus in the first place. Quit clicking on male enhancement ads or 
>>> update your OS occasionally. I'm not going to spend a bunch of time and 
>>> money to make sure someone's bubble of bliss doesn't get popped. Swift, 
>>> effective, cheap. Besides, you're only cut off for 30 days. If in 30 days 
>>> you can prove yourself to be responsible, we can try this again. Well, 
>>> that or a sufficient support request. 
>>> 
>>> Besides, if enough people did hat, the list of blackholes wouldn't be 
>>> huge as someone upstream already blocked them. 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> ----- 
>>> Mike Hammett 
>>> Intelligent Computing Solutions 
>>> http://www.ics-il.com 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>> 
>>> From: "Roland Dobbins" <rdobb...@arbor.net> 
>>> To: nanog@nanog.org 
>>> Sent: Sunday, January 11, 2015 9:29:33 AM 
>>> Subject: Re: DDOS solution recommendation 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> On 11 Jan 2015, at 22:21, Mike Hammett wrote: 
>>>> 
>>>> I'm not saying what you're doing is wrong, I'm saying whatever the 
>>>> industry as a whole is doing obviously isn't working and perhaps a 
>>>> different approach is required.
>>> 
>>> You haven't recommended anything new, and you really need to do some 
>>> reading in order to understand why it isn't as simple as you seem to 
>>> think it is. 
>>> 
>>>> Security teams? My network has me, myself and I.
>>> 
>>> And a relatively small network, too. 
>>> 
>>>> If for example ChinaNet's abuse department isn't doing anything about 
>>>> complains, eventually their whole network gets blocked a /32 at a 
>>>> time. *shrugs* Their loss.
>>> 
>>> Again, it isn't that simple. 
>>> 
>>> ----------------------------------- 
>>> Roland Dobbins <rdobb...@arbor.net>
> 

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