Barry is a well respected security researcher. I'm surprised he posted this.
In his defense, he did it over a year ago (June 11, 2012). Maybe we should ask him about it. I'll do that now.... -- TTFN, patrick On Feb 18, 2014, at 13:31 , Dave Bell <m...@geordish.org> wrote: > That article is terrible. > > Looking at the stats provided, only 2582 unique AS's were tested. > http://www.cidr-report.org/as2.0/#General_Status has over 46k AS's > currently in the routing table. > > This means they have tested around 5% of the AS's on the Internet. > > Dave > > > On 18 February 2014 17:20, Jay Ashworth <j...@baylink.com> wrote: > >> Here's a piece which uses the MIT ANA data to assert that the job is >> mostly done already. >> >> Unless I'm very much mistaken, it appears that a large percentage of the >> failed BCP 38 spoofing tests listed in that data are actually due to >> customer side NAT routers dropping packets... >> >> which is of course egress filtering rather than ingress filtering, and >> thus doesn't actually apply to our questions. >> >> Am I interpreting that correctly? >> >> http://www.senki.org/everyone-should-be-deploying-bcp-38-wait-they-are/ >> >> (Oh, and bcp38.info is now the number 2 Ghit for "bcp38"; thanks to 5 new >> contributors for signing up to help so far this week.) >> >> Cheers, >> - jra >> -- >> Sent from my Android phone with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity. >> >
