That article is terrible. Looking at the stats provided, only 2582 unique AS's were tested. http://www.cidr-report.org/as2.0/#General_Status has over 46k AS's currently in the routing table.
This means they have tested around 5% of the AS's on the Internet. Dave On 18 February 2014 17:20, Jay Ashworth <j...@baylink.com> wrote: > Here's a piece which uses the MIT ANA data to assert that the job is > mostly done already. > > Unless I'm very much mistaken, it appears that a large percentage of the > failed BCP 38 spoofing tests listed in that data are actually due to > customer side NAT routers dropping packets... > > which is of course egress filtering rather than ingress filtering, and > thus doesn't actually apply to our questions. > > Am I interpreting that correctly? > > http://www.senki.org/everyone-should-be-deploying-bcp-38-wait-they-are/ > > (Oh, and bcp38.info is now the number 2 Ghit for "bcp38"; thanks to 5 new > contributors for signing up to help so far this week.) > > Cheers, > - jra > -- > Sent from my Android phone with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity. >
