On Feb 1, 2011, at 1:36 PM, Michael Hallgren wrote: > Le mardi 01 février 2011 à 13:20 -0800, Owen DeLong a écrit : >> On Feb 1, 2011, at 9:14 AM, Christopher Morrow wrote: >> >>> On Sun, Jan 30, 2011 at 2:55 PM, Martin Millnert <milln...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> Here be dragons, >>> <snip> >>>> It should be fairly obvious, by most recently what's going on in >>>> Egypt, why allowing a government to control the Internet is a Really >>>> Bad Idea. >>>> >>> >>> how is the egypt thing related to rPKI? >>> How is the propsed rPKI work related to gov't control? >>> >> RPKI is a big knob governments might be tempted to turn. >> >>>> architecturally/technologically *impossible* for a entity from country >>>> A to via-the-hierarchical-trust-model block a prefix assigned to some >>>> entity in country B, that is assigned by B's RIR and in full >>>> accordance with the RIR policies and in no breach of any contract. >>> >>> countries do not have RIR's, countries have NIR's... regions have RIR's. >> >> RIRs live in countries with governments. >> RIRs are unlikely to mount a successful challenge against an organization >> with tanks and mortars. > > Yes, right. But RIR is (at least supposed to be) regional, so > (hopefully) more stable from a policy point of view (since the number of > national "stake holders" need to agree on a common policy). In theory, > at least... > There is not a single RIR that is not physically located in a country.
You can hope they are more stable from a policy point of view, but, the reality is that if someone shows up at the front door with tanks and mortars, my money is not on the RIR. Owen
