On 11/22/24 04:17, Ryan Bagley wrote:
Below article outlines cases of sabotage (page 81) in 2007
in Bangladesh, 2010 in the Philippines, and attempted sabotage in 2013
in Egypt.
Hardly regular enough to even be considered "periodic".
The Philippines incident was a BMH attack, which is usually the dry
side. So that doesn't really qualify.
I recall the Egypt number... that was pretty brazen, as it nearly
affected a cable I was operating at the time.
I'm not sure Nord Stream qualifies since the cable itself wasn't
directly targeted.
It doesn't.
Arguing about if it was sabotage or not isn't really helpful until
authorities give a statement.
Agreed, which was my initial point.
But in either case it would be good for nations to increase focus on
securing submarine cable infrastructure, in whatever capacity that
might take.
The nature of cables being usually private makes this difficult. The
sheer amount of subsea infrastructure that is out there does not make
this feasible. Some operators do pay a bit of attention to this, but not
in any appreciable degree if you consider the industry at large.
Good on the FCC for finally reviewing that?
As with all things, the devil is in the implementation details.
Mark.
