Owen, I was the Chair of the NRO when it directed the ASO AC to embark on this project to strengthen ICP-2 in order to better represent the accountability of the RIR system to the Internet community. Accordingly, I will respond to that aspect of your post below. (I am otherwise intentionally refraining from discussing the particulars of the principles themselves, as this is a consultation of the community and its views on such topics.)
The process for recognizing an RIR is based predominantly on its initial compliance with the principles developed by this community. While it is theoretically possible to create a second policy document addressing ongoing compliance with the principles, doing so would require detailing the ongoing requirements and would open the possibility of misalignment of principles between the two documents. Furthermore, it would necessitate agreement by all parties to a second document and introduces risk of edge cases where RIRs might be party to one document but not the other. It is not uncommon for the entire lifecycle of a relationship to be contained within a single document (covering establishment, joint activity, and termination). In light of the risks mentioned above, the NRO-EC asked the ASO AC to review and strengthen the existing ICP-2, ensuring its requirements were current and adequate. This approach seemed more straightforward than asking the ASO AC to both review and update the requirements within the existing ICP-2 policy document and then embark on creating an entirely new document “purpose built for dealing with the ongoing requirements and rules by which RIRs operate and remain in the system” as you suggested below. I hope this helps explain the reasoning behind the current process (while recognizing that others may weigh the tradeoffs involved differently.) Thanks! /John John Curran President and CEO American Registry for Internet Numbers On Nov 20, 2024, at 4:20 PM, Owen DeLong via NANOG <nanog@nanog.org> wrote: I personally think this entire process is the wrong answer to a semi right question. Contrary to popular illusion, ICP-2 is about the criteria by which ICANN can accept a new RIR into the system. In my opinion, there’s no need for significant improvement in that process. The critical oversight that needs to be addressed is that we’ve made no allowance for disciplining or resolving rogue RIRs and now we have one. Rather than seeking to turn ICP-2 into something it is not and never should have been, we should be seeking to develop a new document purpose built for dealing with the ongoing requirements and rules by which RIRs operate and remain in the system. To that end, I do not think a simple majority vote of the NRO EC should be sufficient to remove an RIR from the system. Said vote is a reasonable first step, but some mechanism must exist by which that vote must be ratified by a body that is both more accountable to and more representative of the larger community. Not a single member of the NRO EC is elected by anyone. Each of them is appointed by the respective boards of the RIRs in question. Further, a simple majority is only 3 votes. Surely, such a global and far reaching decision with such serious impact should be deliberated by a body of more than 5 individuals, one of which has a clear conflict of interest in the proceedings. I hate this answer and hope someone else can come up with something better, but the best I’ve come up with so far is ratification by the board of the central registry (currently ICANN/PTI). Owen On Nov 20, 2024, at 09:52, Owen DeLong <o...@delong.com> wrote: On Nov 19, 2024, at 13:12, Noah <n...@neo.co.tz> wrote: On Tue, 19 Nov 2024, 22:50 Owen DeLong, <o...@delong.com<mailto:o...@delong.com>> wrote: The RIRs each have a geographic monopoly and at their creation, this is required by ICP-2 (the original). This has nothing to do with where you land on any of your subsequent questions. Are the European Union or African Union, geographic monopolies? I don’t know enough about the structure of the African union to comment, but to the extent other territorial monopolies (the member nation states) have ceded sovereignty on specific topics to the EU, yes, the EU is a geographic monopoly. The NRO cartel has agreed to specific territories served by each RIR, granting each a geographic monopoly. You write as if a couple of guys formed an organization and decided how the system must work. I didn’t specify quantity, but otherwise, your description isn’t far off from what happened. FWIW, the RIRs (NRO) are an outcome of wider internet community engagents that lasted years if not decade for which you historically particpated in as a member of the said communities. Most of the rules of engagent were decided through wider consultations at policy debates and some by those elected by various internet communities. The community had input, but in the early days, all of the decisions were made by small numbers of people behind closed doors who were supposed to consider, but not necessarily follow said community input. Do not confuse the RIR/NRO system with the pseudo-private enterprises operated by sole propriators who believe that they can change a system that has served the public so well for decades and continue to do so. I have no such illusions. However, I also don’t share your rose colored view of the current situation. Yes, the RIRs have mostly done a good job and 4 of them are operating similarly to what you describe (fortunately). One is completely off the rails, has no legitimate board and no legitimate executive, continues to operate contrary to court orders, under the supposed leadership of a self-appointed former board member. The fact that the other 4, the community, and the membership have no mechanism by which they can reign this behavior in is the primary source of the desire to change ICP-2 from a one and done document for creating RIRs to a document guiding the ongoing operation of RIRs and providing additional checks and balances to deal with rogue RIRs. Because organizations served by RIRs are not constrained by those boundaries, many operate in more than one region and the rules get fuzzy, but in general, territorial exclusivity is long established. And countries do have some embassies in different other countries. Yes and no. Technically, embassies are considered sovereign territory of the country represented and inviolable by the host country. Your comment is orthogonal to the geographic monopoly of the RIRs. I’m not saying this is good or bad. I see benefits to it, but I also see reasons it might be better to phase it out. In any case, it might be worth considering granting a certain right of a registrant to transfer the servicing of their registration to the RIR of their choosing. Each region has its own rules of engagement. When such registrant decides to play in a certain service region, they must comply with existing rules of the game in the said region. And what is to be done when the RIR chooses not to play by its own rules? Owen
