This seems like Rube Goldberg Machine levels of complexity and overhead to try and solve for forged-origin , when good best practices already makes the risk of that almost negligible.
On Fri, Jan 21, 2022 at 5:22 PM Yixin Sun <yix...@alumni.princeton.edu> wrote: > Dear Nanog, > > We appreciate that your time is very precious, but we wanted to ask you > for your help in answering a brief survey about a new secure routing system > we have developed in a research collaboration between ETH, Princeton > University, and University of Virginia. We'd like to thank those of you who > have already helped us fill out the survey and provided insightful > feedback. Your input is critical for helping inform our further work on > this project. > > Here is the link to our survey, which takes about 10 minutes to complete, > including watching a brief 3-minute introductory video: > > https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSc4VCkqd7i88y0CbJ31B7tVXyxBlhEy_zsYZByx6tsKAE7ROg/viewform?usp=pp_url&entry.549791324=NANOG+mailing+list > > Our architecture, called Secure Backbone AS (SBAS), allows clients to > benefit from emerging secure routing deployments like SCION by tunneling > into a secure infrastructure. SBAS provides substantial routing security > improvements when retrofitted to the current Internet. It also provides > benefits even to non-participating networks and endpoints when > communicating with an SBAS-protected entity. > > We currently have a functional prototype of this network using SCIONLab > (for the secure backbone) and the PEERING testbed (to make outbound BGP > announcements). Our ultimate aim is to develop and deploy SBAS beyond an > experimental scope, and the input of network operators that would actually > have to run these PoPs would greatly benefit this project and help make > secure routing a reality. > > With kind regards, > Prateek, Adrian, and Yixin >
