Le mar. 16 févr. 2021 à 21:03, Job Snijders via NANOG <nanog@nanog.org> a écrit : > > https://labs.ripe.net/Members/erik/ripe-ncc-and-duke-university-bgp-experiment/ > > The experiment triggered a bug in some Cisco router models: affected > Ciscos would corrupt this specific BGP announcement ** ON OUTBOUND **. > Any peers of such Ciscos receiving this BGP update, would (according to > then current RFCs) consider the BGP UPDATE corrupted, and would > subsequently tear down the BGP sessions with the Ciscos. Because the > corruption was not detected by the Ciscos themselves, whenever the > sessions would come back online again they'd reannounce the corrupted > update, causing a session tear down. Bounce ... Bounce ... Bounce ... at > global scale in both IBGP and EBGP! :-)
In a similar fashion, a network I know had a massive outage when a failing linecard corrupted is-is lsps, triggering a flood of purges and taking down the whole backbone. This was pre-rfc6232, so you can guess that resolving the issue was a real PITA. This kind of outages fuels my netops nightmares.
