On Fri, Jun 19, 2020 at 09:48:32AM +0200, Vincent Lefevre wrote:
On 2020-06-18 18:14:15 -0700, Kevin J. McCarthy wrote: + /* L10N: + The server is not supposed to send data immediately after + confirming STARTTLS. This warns the user that something + weird is going on. + */ + mutt_error _("Warning: clearing unexpected buffered data before STARTTLS");The "before STARTTLS" is not clear. Doesn't this occur *after* STARTTLS has occurred?
I had some trouble coming up with a good message. The buffered data is after the STARTTLS command is confirmed, but before the actual STARTTLS negotiation takes place. If the terminology is bad, I'll be happy to change it though. Would it make more sense to just say "Warning: clearing unexpected buffered data after STARTTLS"?
So a user who knows that some server supports STARTTLS and isn't aware of this attack may think that everything will be OK and that the connection will be encrypted with this server, while this may actually not be the case. I think that this should be documented, and the manual should advise users to set ssl_force_tls.
Okay, I'll be happy to add a note to the $ssl_startls documentation noting the attack and encouraging to set $ssl_force_tls.
On a different note, my CVE request hasn't been replied to, and I didn't receive a confirmation email after submission. Does anyone have experience in how long these things take?
-- Kevin J. McCarthy GPG Fingerprint: 8975 A9B3 3AA3 7910 385C 5308 ADEF 7684 8031 6BDA
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