changeset: 6466:e5fe2f80e797 user: Kevin McCarthy <ke...@8t8.us> date: Tue Jul 21 12:34:49 2015 -0700 link: http://dev.mutt.org/hg/mutt/rev/e5fe2f80e797
Imap: Fix flag caching after sync. The flags cached in IMAP_HEADER_DATA were not updated to match the HEADER flags after a sync. This means if a flag were toggled and synced twice, the second sync was not sending the flag update. Thanks to Noah Misch for the patch. changeset: 6467:704e0622cc67 user: Kevin McCarthy <ke...@8t8.us> date: Tue Jul 21 12:41:13 2015 -0700 link: http://dev.mutt.org/hg/mutt/rev/704e0622cc67 merge stable diffs (truncated from 11833 to 950 lines): diff -r 70b85d8b232b -r 704e0622cc67 .hgignore --- a/.hgignore Tue Feb 10 18:29:24 2015 +0100 +++ b/.hgignore Tue Jul 21 12:41:13 2015 -0700 @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ ^depcomp$ ^install-sh$ ^missing$ +^mkinstalldirs$ # built objects ^flea$ @@ -37,6 +38,8 @@ ^doc/manual\.(txt|xml|aux|log|out|tex|pdf)$ ^doc/mutt\.1$ ^doc/muttrc\.man$ +^doc/pgpewrap\.1$ +^doc/pgpring\.1$ ^doc/.*\.html$ ^doc/stamp- ^doc/smime_keys\.1$ @@ -53,6 +56,9 @@ syntax: glob .deps Makefile +GPATH +GRTAGS +GTAGS TAGS cscope.* *.swp diff -r 70b85d8b232b -r 704e0622cc67 INSTALL --- a/INSTALL Tue Feb 10 18:29:24 2015 +0100 +++ b/INSTALL Tue Jul 21 12:41:13 2015 -0700 @@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ For the real fix, applying Sun patches # 105490-05 (linker patch) and # 105210-17 (libc and malloc patch) from sunsolve.sun.com has been reported to stop these problems - from occuring. + from occurring. Linux diff -r 70b85d8b232b -r 704e0622cc67 Makefile.am --- a/Makefile.am Tue Feb 10 18:29:24 2015 +0100 +++ b/Makefile.am Tue Jul 21 12:41:13 2015 -0700 @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ ## Process this file with automake to produce Makefile.in ## Use aclocal -I m4; automake --foreign +include $(top_srcdir)/flymake.am AUTOMAKE_OPTIONS = 1.6 foreign EXTRA_PROGRAMS = mutt_dotlock pgpring pgpewrap mutt_md5 @@ -11,7 +12,7 @@ SUBDIRS = m4 po intl doc contrib $(IMAP_SUBDIR) -bin_SCRIPTS = muttbug flea @SMIMEAUX_TARGET@ +bin_SCRIPTS = muttbug flea $(SMIMEAUX_TARGET) if BUILD_HCACHE HCVERSION = hcversion.h @@ -19,7 +20,7 @@ BUILT_SOURCES = keymap_defs.h patchlist.c reldate.h conststrings.c $(HCVERSION) -bin_PROGRAMS = mutt @DOTLOCK_TARGET@ @PGPAUX_TARGET@ +bin_PROGRAMS = mutt $(DOTLOCK_TARGET) $(PGPAUX_TARGET) mutt_SOURCES = \ addrbook.c alias.c attach.c base64.c browser.c buffy.c color.c \ crypt.c cryptglue.c \ @@ -37,10 +38,10 @@ nodist_mutt_SOURCES = $(BUILT_SOURCES) -mutt_LDADD = @MUTT_LIB_OBJECTS@ @LIBOBJS@ $(LIBIMAP) $(MUTTLIBS) \ +mutt_LDADD = $(MUTT_LIB_OBJECTS) $(LIBOBJS) $(LIBIMAP) $(MUTTLIBS) \ $(INTLLIBS) $(LIBICONV) $(GPGME_LIBS) -mutt_DEPENDENCIES = @MUTT_LIB_OBJECTS@ @LIBOBJS@ $(LIBIMAPDEPS) \ +mutt_DEPENDENCIES = $(MUTT_LIB_OBJECTS) $(LIBOBJS) $(LIBIMAPDEPS) \ $(INTLDEPS) DEFS=-DPKGDATADIR=\"$(pkgdatadir)\" -DSYSCONFDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \ @@ -49,8 +50,6 @@ AM_CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(top_srcdir) $(IMAP_INCLUDES) $(GPGME_CFLAGS) -Iintl -CPPFLAGS=@CPPFLAGS@ - EXTRA_mutt_SOURCES = account.c bcache.c crypt-gpgme.c crypt-mod-pgp-classic.c \ crypt-mod-pgp-gpgme.c crypt-mod-smime-classic.c \ crypt-mod-smime-gpgme.c dotlock.c gnupgparse.c hcache.c md5.c \ @@ -79,12 +78,12 @@ EXTRA_SCRIPTS = smime_keys mutt_dotlock_SOURCES = mutt_dotlock.c -mutt_dotlock_LDADD = @LIBOBJS@ -mutt_dotlock_DEPENDENCIES = @LIBOBJS@ +mutt_dotlock_LDADD = $(LIBOBJS) +mutt_dotlock_DEPENDENCIES = $(LIBOBJS) pgpring_SOURCES = pgppubring.c pgplib.c lib.c extlib.c sha1.c md5.c pgppacket.c ascii.c -pgpring_LDADD = @LIBOBJS@ $(INTLLIBS) -pgpring_DEPENDENCIES = @LIBOBJS@ $(INTLDEPS) +pgpring_LDADD = $(LIBOBJS) $(INTLLIBS) +pgpring_DEPENDENCIES = $(LIBOBJS) $(INTLDEPS) mutt_md5_SOURCES = md5.c mutt_md5_CFLAGS = -DMD5UTIL @@ -118,7 +117,7 @@ ACLOCAL_AMFLAGS = -I m4 -LDADD = @LIBOBJS@ @INTLLIBS@ +LDADD = $(LIBOBJS) $(INTLLIBS) flea: muttbug.sh cp muttbug.sh flea @@ -154,14 +153,14 @@ rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/mutt.dotlock ; \ ln -sf $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/mutt_dotlock $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/mutt.dotlock ; \ fi - if test -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/mutt_dotlock && test x@DOTLOCK_GROUP@ != x ; then \ - chgrp @DOTLOCK_GROUP@ $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/mutt_dotlock && \ - chmod @DOTLOCK_PERMISSION@ $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/mutt_dotlock || \ + if test -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/mutt_dotlock && test x$(DOTLOCK_GROUP) != x ; then \ + chgrp $(DOTLOCK_GROUP) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/mutt_dotlock && \ + chmod $(DOTLOCK_PERMISSION) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/mutt_dotlock || \ { echo "Can't fix mutt_dotlock's permissions! This is required to lock mailboxes in the mail spool directory." >&2 ; exit 1 ; } \ fi install-data-local: - $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir) + $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir) $(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/mime.types $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/mime.types.dist -if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/mime.types ]; then \ $(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/mime.types $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir); \ diff -r 70b85d8b232b -r 704e0622cc67 README.SECURITY --- a/README.SECURITY Tue Feb 10 18:29:24 2015 +0100 +++ b/README.SECURITY Tue Jul 21 12:41:13 2015 -0700 @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ - Backticks are handled specially when preparing % expandos for mailcap entries. This fix will keep the current problem from - occuring, but we are sure there are other possible mailcap entries + occurring, but we are sure there are other possible mailcap entries where this doesn't help. - We have added a configuration variable named $mailcap_sanitize, diff -r 70b85d8b232b -r 704e0622cc67 README.SSL --- a/README.SSL Tue Feb 10 18:29:24 2015 +0100 +++ b/README.SSL Tue Jul 21 12:41:13 2015 -0700 @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ openssl s_client -host <imap server> -port <port> -verify -debug -no_ssl2 openssl s_client -host <imap server> -port <port> -verify -debug -no_ssl3 -You can also combine the options until you get a successfull connect. Once +You can also combine the options until you get a successful connect. Once you know which options do not work, you can set the variables for non-working protocols to know. The variables for the protocols are ssl_use_tlsv1, ssl_use_sslv2, and ssl_use_sslv3. diff -r 70b85d8b232b -r 704e0622cc67 TODO --- a/TODO Tue Feb 10 18:29:24 2015 +0100 +++ b/TODO Tue Jul 21 12:41:13 2015 -0700 @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ Note: This still requires some thought, since we'd have to store per-entry data in the menu structure. As an alternative, we could extend the tag method to do something to more general flags. The - latter approach would make the implementation of propper + latter approach would make the implementation of proper tag-prefix behaviour more simple: Functions should only be applied when a message is tagged and visible. Additionally, we must not access a menu's max field directly any more: Adding an entry to a diff -r 70b85d8b232b -r 704e0622cc67 UPDATING --- a/UPDATING Tue Feb 10 18:29:24 2015 +0100 +++ b/UPDATING Tue Jul 21 12:41:13 2015 -0700 @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ ! FCC is now preserved when postponing a message. ! Mail-Followup-To is now preserved when recalling a postponed message. ! Allow filename prompt when saving multiple attachments to a directory. + + terminal status-line (TS) support, a.k.a. xterm title. see the + following variables: $ts_enabled, $ts_icon_format, $ts_status_format 1.5.22 (2013-10-18): diff -r 70b85d8b232b -r 704e0622cc67 build-release --- a/build-release Tue Feb 10 18:29:24 2015 +0100 +++ b/build-release Tue Jul 21 12:41:13 2015 -0700 @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ # now, prepare the distribution tar balls -automake +automake --add-missing --copy --force-missing touch configure.ac make config.status ./config.status diff -r 70b85d8b232b -r 704e0622cc67 color.c --- a/color.c Tue Feb 10 18:29:24 2015 +0100 +++ b/color.c Tue Jul 21 12:41:13 2015 -0700 @@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ { "bold", MT_COLOR_BOLD }, { "underline", MT_COLOR_UNDERLINE }, { "index", MT_COLOR_INDEX }, + { "prompt", MT_COLOR_PROMPT }, { NULL, 0 } }; diff -r 70b85d8b232b -r 704e0622cc67 commands.c --- a/commands.c Tue Feb 10 18:29:24 2015 +0100 +++ b/commands.c Tue Jul 21 12:41:13 2015 -0700 @@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ if (rc || !buf[0]) return; - if (!(adr = rfc822_parse_adrlist (adr, buf))) + if (!(adr = mutt_parse_adrlist (adr, buf))) { mutt_error _("Error parsing address!"); return; diff -r 70b85d8b232b -r 704e0622cc67 compose.c --- a/compose.c Tue Feb 10 18:29:24 2015 +0100 +++ b/compose.c Tue Jul 21 12:41:13 2015 -0700 @@ -141,6 +141,9 @@ addstr (_(" (S/MIME)")); } + if (option (OPTCRYPTOPPORTUNISTICENCRYPT) && (msg->security & OPPENCRYPT)) + addstr (_(" (OppEnc mode)")); + clrtoeol (); move (HDR_CRYPTINFO, 0); clrtoeol (); @@ -526,14 +529,29 @@ break; case OP_COMPOSE_EDIT_TO: menu->redraw = edit_address_list (HDR_TO, &msg->env->to); + if (option (OPTCRYPTOPPORTUNISTICENCRYPT)) + { + crypt_opportunistic_encrypt (msg); + redraw_crypt_lines (msg); + } mutt_message_hook (NULL, msg, M_SEND2HOOK); break; case OP_COMPOSE_EDIT_BCC: menu->redraw = edit_address_list (HDR_BCC, &msg->env->bcc); + if (option (OPTCRYPTOPPORTUNISTICENCRYPT)) + { + crypt_opportunistic_encrypt (msg); + redraw_crypt_lines (msg); + } mutt_message_hook (NULL, msg, M_SEND2HOOK); break; case OP_COMPOSE_EDIT_CC: menu->redraw = edit_address_list (HDR_CC, &msg->env->cc); + if (option (OPTCRYPTOPPORTUNISTICENCRYPT)) + { + crypt_opportunistic_encrypt (msg); + redraw_crypt_lines (msg); + } mutt_message_hook (NULL, msg, M_SEND2HOOK); break; case OP_COMPOSE_EDIT_SUBJECT: @@ -593,6 +611,8 @@ mutt_error (_("Bad IDN in \"%s\": '%s'"), tag, err); FREE (&err); } + if (option (OPTCRYPTOPPORTUNISTICENCRYPT)) + crypt_opportunistic_encrypt (msg); } else { @@ -1220,7 +1240,8 @@ mutt_clear_error (); break; } - msg->security = 0; + msg->security &= ~APPLICATION_SMIME; + msg->security |= APPLICATION_PGP; } msg->security = crypt_pgp_send_menu (msg, &menu->redraw); redraw_crypt_lines (msg); @@ -1246,7 +1267,8 @@ mutt_clear_error (); break; } - msg->security = 0; + msg->security &= ~APPLICATION_PGP; + msg->security |= APPLICATION_SMIME; } msg->security = crypt_smime_send_menu(msg, &menu->redraw); redraw_crypt_lines (msg); diff -r 70b85d8b232b -r 704e0622cc67 configure.ac --- a/configure.ac Tue Feb 10 18:29:24 2015 +0100 +++ b/configure.ac Tue Jul 21 12:41:13 2015 -0700 @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ AC_PROG_CPP AC_PROG_MAKE_SET AC_PROG_INSTALL +AC_PROG_MKDIR_P AC_PROG_RANLIB AC_CHECK_TOOL(AR, ar, ar) @@ -138,6 +139,11 @@ #needed to get GPGME_LIBS and al correctly AM_PATH_GPGME(1.0.0, AC_DEFINE(CRYPT_BACKEND_GPGME, 1, [Define if you use GPGME to support OpenPGP])) + dnl AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gpgme_op_export_keys]) + saved_LIBS="$LIBS" + LIBS="$LIBS $GPGME_LIBS" + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gpgme_op_export_keys]) + LIBS="$saved_LIBS" MUTT_LIB_OBJECTS="$MUTT_LIB_OBJECTS crypt-gpgme.o crypt-mod-pgp-gpgme.o crypt-mod-smime-gpgme.o" fi else @@ -163,7 +169,7 @@ ]) if test x$have_smime != xno ; then - AC_DEFINE(CRYPT_BACKEND_CLASSIC_SMIME, 1, [Define if you want clasic S/MIME support.]) + AC_DEFINE(CRYPT_BACKEND_CLASSIC_SMIME, 1, [Define if you want classic S/MIME support.]) MUTT_LIB_OBJECTS="$MUTT_LIB_OBJECTS smime.o crypt-mod-smime-classic.o" SMIMEAUX_TARGET="smime_keys" fi @@ -295,6 +301,7 @@ if test "$ac_cv_func_decl_resizeterm" = yes; then MUTT_LIB_OBJECTS="$MUTT_LIB_OBJECTS resize.o" fi + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([use_extended_names]) LIBS="$old_LIBS" ]) @@ -706,6 +713,16 @@ AC_CHECK_DECLS([GNUTLS_VERIFY_DISABLE_TIME_CHECKS], [], [], [[#include <gnutls/x509.h>]]) + LIBS="$LIBS -lgnutls" + AC_CHECK_FUNCS(gnutls_priority_set_direct) + AC_CHECK_TYPES([gnutls_certificate_credentials_t, + gnutls_certificate_status_t, + gnutls_datum_t, + gnutls_digest_algorithm_t, + gnutls_session_t, + gnutls_transport_ptr_t, + gnutls_x509_crt_t], [], [], [[#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>]]) + LIBS="$saved_LIBS" MUTTLIBS="$MUTTLIBS -lgnutls" diff -r 70b85d8b232b -r 704e0622cc67 contrib/Makefile.am --- a/contrib/Makefile.am Tue Feb 10 18:29:24 2015 +0100 +++ b/contrib/Makefile.am Tue Jul 21 12:41:13 2015 -0700 @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ iconv/make.sh install-data-local: - $(top_srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(docdir)/samples $(DESTDIR)$(docdir)/samples/iconv + $(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(docdir)/samples $(DESTDIR)$(docdir)/samples/iconv for f in $(SAMPLES) ; do \ $(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/$$f $(DESTDIR)$(docdir)/samples ; \ done diff -r 70b85d8b232b -r 704e0622cc67 contrib/colors.default --- a/contrib/colors.default Tue Feb 10 18:29:24 2015 +0100 +++ b/contrib/colors.default Tue Jul 21 12:41:13 2015 -0700 @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ color quoted blue white color signature red white color attachment red white +color prompt brightmagenta white color message brightred white color error brightred white color indicator brightyellow red diff -r 70b85d8b232b -r 704e0622cc67 contrib/colors.linux --- a/contrib/colors.linux Tue Feb 10 18:29:24 2015 +0100 +++ b/contrib/colors.linux Tue Jul 21 12:41:13 2015 -0700 @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ color quoted blue black color signature blue black color attachment red black +color prompt brightmagenta black color message brightred black color error brightred black color indicator black red diff -r 70b85d8b232b -r 704e0622cc67 contrib/gpg.rc --- a/contrib/gpg.rc Tue Feb 10 18:29:24 2015 +0100 +++ b/contrib/gpg.rc Tue Jul 21 12:41:13 2015 -0700 @@ -65,10 +65,10 @@ set pgp_verify_key_command="gpg --verbose --batch --fingerprint --check-sigs %r" # read in the public key ring -set pgp_list_pubring_command="gpg --no-verbose --batch --quiet --with-colons --list-keys %r" +set pgp_list_pubring_command="gpg --no-verbose --batch --quiet --with-colons --with-fingerprint --with-fingerprint --list-keys %r" # read in the secret key ring -set pgp_list_secring_command="gpg --no-verbose --batch --quiet --with-colons --list-secret-keys %r" +set pgp_list_secring_command="gpg --no-verbose --batch --quiet --with-colons --with-fingerprint --with-fingerprint --list-secret-keys %r" # fetch keys # set pgp_getkeys_command="pkspxycwrap %r" diff -r 70b85d8b232b -r 704e0622cc67 contrib/smime.rc --- a/contrib/smime.rc Tue Feb 10 18:29:24 2015 +0100 +++ b/contrib/smime.rc Tue Jul 21 12:41:13 2015 -0700 @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ # will be the default method unless the following option is set set smime_is_default -# Uncoment this if you don't want to set labels for certificates you add. +# Uncomment this if you don't want to set labels for certificates you add. # unset smime_ask_cert_label # Passphrase expiration @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ # line and replace the keyid with your own. set smime_default_key="12345678.0" -# Uncommen to make mutt ask what key to use when trying to decrypt a message. +# Uncomment to make mutt ask what key to use when trying to decrypt a message. # It will use the default key above (if that was set) else. # unset smime_decrypt_use_default_key @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ set smime_get_signer_cert_command="openssl smime -verify -in %f -noverify -signer %c -out /dev/null" # This is used to get the email address the certificate was issued to. -set smime_get_cert_email_command="openssl x509 -in %f -noout -email" +set smime_get_cert_email_command="openssl x509 -in %f -noout -email" # Add a certificate to the database using smime_keys. set smime_import_cert_command="smime_keys add_cert %f" @@ -59,10 +59,10 @@ # Sction B: Outgoing messages # Algorithm to use for encryption. -# valid choices are rc2-40, rc2-64, rc2-128, des, des3 -set smime_encrypt_with="des3" +# valid choices are aes128, aes192, aes256, rc2-40, rc2-64, rc2-128, des, des3 +set smime_encrypt_with="aes256" -# Encrypt a message. Input file is a MIME entity. +# Encrypt a message. Input file is a MIME entity. set smime_encrypt_command="openssl smime -encrypt -%a -outform DER -in %f %c" # Sign. @@ -72,8 +72,8 @@ #Section C: Incoming messages -# Decrypt a message. Output is a MIME entity. -set smime_decrypt_command="openssl smime -decrypt -passin stdin -inform DER -in %f -inkey %k -recip %c" +# Decrypt a message. Output is a MIME entity. +set smime_decrypt_command="openssl smime -decrypt -passin stdin -inform DER -in %f -inkey %k -recip %c" # Verify a signature of type multipart/signed set smime_verify_command="openssl smime -verify -inform DER -in %s %C -content %f" @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ # your public key, use this command instead. # set smime_sign_command="openssl smime -sign -signer %c -inkey %k -passin stdin -in %f -outform DER" # -# In order to verify the signature only and skip checking the certificate chain: +# In order to verify the signature only and skip checking the certificate chain: # # set smime_verify_command="openssl smime -verify -inform DER -in %s -content %f -noverify" # set smime_verify_opaque_command="openssl smime -verify -inform DER -in %s -noverify" diff -r 70b85d8b232b -r 704e0622cc67 crypt-gpgme.c --- a/crypt-gpgme.c Tue Feb 10 18:29:24 2015 +0100 +++ b/crypt-gpgme.c Tue Jul 21 12:41:13 2015 -0700 @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ int idx; /* and the user ID at this index */ const char *uid; /* and for convenience point to this user ID */ unsigned int flags; /* global and per uid flags (for convenience)*/ + gpgme_validity_t validity; /* uid validity (cached for convenience) */ } crypt_key_t; typedef struct crypt_entry @@ -179,6 +180,34 @@ return s; } +/* Return the long keyID for the key K. */ +static const char *crypt_long_keyid (crypt_key_t *k) +{ + const char *s = "????????????????"; + + if (k->kobj && k->kobj->subkeys) + { + s = k->kobj->subkeys->keyid; + } + + return s; +} + +/* Return the short keyID for the key K. */ +static const char *crypt_short_keyid (crypt_key_t *k) +{ + const char *s = "????????"; + + if (k->kobj && k->kobj->subkeys) + { + s = k->kobj->subkeys->keyid; + if (strlen (s) == 16) + s += 8; + } + + return s; +} + /* Return the hexstring fingerprint from the key K. */ static const char *crypt_fpr (crypt_key_t *k) { @@ -190,6 +219,24 @@ return s; } +/* Returns the fingerprint if available, otherwise + * returns the long keyid. + */ +static const char *crypt_fpr_or_lkeyid(crypt_key_t *k) +{ + const char *s = "????????????????"; + + if (k->kobj && k->kobj->subkeys) + { + if (k->kobj->subkeys->fpr) + s = k->kobj->subkeys->fpr; + else + s = k->kobj->subkeys->keyid; + } + + return s; +} + /* Parse FLAGS and return a statically allocated(!) string with them. */ static char *crypt_key_abilities (int flags) { @@ -240,6 +287,7 @@ k->idx = key->idx; k->uid = key->uid; k->flags = key->flags; + k->validity = key->validity; return k; } @@ -248,12 +296,19 @@ to NULL. */ static void crypt_free_key (crypt_key_t **keylist) { + crypt_key_t *k; + + if (!keylist) + return; + while (*keylist) - { - crypt_key_t *k = (*keylist)->next; - FREE (&k); - *keylist = k; - } + { + k = *keylist; + *keylist = (*keylist)->next; + + gpgme_key_unref (k->kobj); + FREE (&k); + } } /* Return trute when key K is valid. */ @@ -267,21 +322,12 @@ /* Return true whe validity of KEY is sufficient. */ static int crypt_id_is_strong (crypt_key_t *key) { - gpgme_validity_t val = GPGME_VALIDITY_UNKNOWN; - gpgme_user_id_t uid = NULL; unsigned int is_strong = 0; - unsigned int i = 0; if ((key->flags & KEYFLAG_ISX509)) return 1; - for (i = 0, uid = key->kobj->uids; (i < key->idx) && uid; - i++, uid = uid->next) - ; - if (uid) - val = uid->validity; - - switch (val) + switch (key->validity) { case GPGME_VALIDITY_UNKNOWN: case GPGME_VALIDITY_UNDEFINED: @@ -504,21 +550,27 @@ return 0; } -/* Copy a data object to a newly created temporay file and return that - filename. Caller must free. With RET_FP not NULL, don't close the - stream but return it there. */ -static char *data_object_to_tempfile (gpgme_data_t data, FILE **ret_fp) +/* Copy a data object to a temporary file. + * The tempfile name may be optionally passed in. + * If ret_fp is passed in, the file will be rewound, left open, and returned + * via that parameter. + * The tempfile name is returned, and must be freed. + */ +static char *data_object_to_tempfile (gpgme_data_t data, char *tempf, FILE **ret_fp) { int err; - char tempfile[_POSIX_PATH_MAX]; + char tempfb[_POSIX_PATH_MAX]; FILE *fp; size_t nread = 0; - mutt_mktemp (tempfile, sizeof (tempfile)); - fp = safe_fopen (tempfile, "w+"); - if (!fp) + if (!tempf) { - mutt_perror (tempfile); + mutt_mktemp (tempfb, sizeof (tempfb)); + tempf = tempfb; + } + if ((fp = safe_fopen (tempf, tempf == tempfb ? "w+" : "a+")) == NULL) + { + mutt_perror _("Can't create temporary file"); return NULL; } @@ -532,9 +584,9 @@ { if (fwrite (buf, nread, 1, fp) != 1) { - mutt_perror (tempfile); + mutt_perror (tempf); safe_fclose (&fp); - unlink (tempfile); + unlink (tempf); return NULL; } } @@ -546,13 +598,35 @@ if (nread == -1) { mutt_error (_("error reading data object: %s\n"), gpgme_strerror (err)); - unlink (tempfile); + unlink (tempf); safe_fclose (&fp); return NULL; } if (ret_fp) *ret_fp = fp; - return safe_strdup (tempfile); + return safe_strdup (tempf); +} + + +static void free_recipient_set (gpgme_key_t **p_rset) +{ + gpgme_key_t *rset, k; + + if (!p_rset) + return; + + rset = *p_rset; + if (!rset) + return; + + while (*rset) + { + k = *rset; + gpgme_key_unref (k); + rset++; + } + + FREE (p_rset); /* __FREE_CHECKED__ */ } @@ -608,7 +682,9 @@ { mutt_error (_("error adding recipient `%s': %s\n"), buf, gpgme_strerror (err)); - FREE (&rset); + rset[rset_n] = NULL; + free_recipient_set (&rset); + gpgme_release (context); return NULL; } } @@ -651,8 +727,8 @@ err = gpgme_op_keylist_next (listctx, &key2); if (!err) { - gpgme_key_release (key); - gpgme_key_release (key2); + gpgme_key_unref (key); + gpgme_key_unref (key2); gpgme_release (listctx); mutt_error (_("ambiguous specification of secret key `%s'\n"), signid); @@ -663,7 +739,7 @@ gpgme_signers_clear (ctx); err = gpgme_signers_add (ctx, key); - gpgme_key_release (key); + gpgme_key_unref (key); if (err) { mutt_error (_("error setting secret key `%s': %s\n"), @@ -747,7 +823,7 @@ gpgme_release (ctx); - outfile = data_object_to_tempfile (ciphertext, NULL); + outfile = data_object_to_tempfile (ciphertext, NULL, NULL); gpgme_data_release (ciphertext); return outfile; } @@ -834,6 +910,7 @@ if (set_signer (ctx, use_smime)) { gpgme_data_release (signature); + gpgme_data_release (message); gpgme_release (ctx); return NULL; } @@ -872,7 +949,7 @@ return NULL; } - sigfile = data_object_to_tempfile (signature, NULL); + sigfile = data_object_to_tempfile (signature, NULL, NULL); gpgme_data_release (signature); if (!sigfile) { @@ -918,6 +995,7 @@ else { t->subtype = safe_strdup ("pgp-signature"); + mutt_set_parameter ("name", "signature.asc", &t->parameter); t->use_disp = 0; t->disposition = DISPNONE; t->encoding = ENC7BIT; @@ -961,13 +1039,13 @@ plaintext = body_to_data_object (a, 0); if (!plaintext) { - FREE (&rset); + free_recipient_set (&rset); return NULL; } outfile = encrypt_gpgme_object (plaintext, rset, 0, sign); gpgme_data_release (plaintext); - FREE (&rset); + free_recipient_set (&rset); if (!outfile) return NULL; @@ -1020,13 +1098,13 @@ plaintext = body_to_data_object (a, 0); if (!plaintext) { - FREE (&rset); + free_recipient_set (&rset); return NULL; } outfile = encrypt_gpgme_object (plaintext, rset, 1, 0); gpgme_data_release (plaintext); - FREE (&rset); + free_recipient_set (&rset); if (!outfile) return NULL; @@ -1342,7 +1420,7 @@ if (signature_key) { - gpgme_key_release (signature_key); + gpgme_key_unref (signature_key); signature_key = NULL; } @@ -1420,7 +1498,7 @@ } if (key != signature_key) - gpgme_key_release (key); + gpgme_key_unref (key); } return anybad ? 1 : anywarn ? 2 : 0; @@ -1461,6 +1539,9 @@ state_attach_puts (_("[-- Begin signature information --]\n"), s); err = gpgme_op_verify (ctx, signature, message, NULL); + gpgme_data_release (message); + gpgme_data_release (signature); + mutt_need_hard_redraw (); if (err) { @@ -1478,7 +1559,7 @@ if (signature_key) { - gpgme_key_release (signature_key); + gpgme_key_unref (signature_key); signature_key = NULL; } @@ -1966,7 +2047,7 @@ subkey = subkey->next; more = 1; } - gpgme_key_release (key); + gpgme_key_unref (key); } if (gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_EOF) { @@ -2148,7 +2229,7 @@ char *fname; FILE *fp; - fname = data_object_to_tempfile (data, &fp); + fname = data_object_to_tempfile (data, NULL, &fp); if (!fname) return; unlink (fname); @@ -2341,7 +2422,7 @@ "information --]\n\n"), s); } - tmpfname = data_object_to_tempfile (plaintext, &pgpout); + tmpfname = data_object_to_tempfile (plaintext, NULL, &pgpout); if (!tmpfname) { pgpout = NULL; @@ -2353,6 +2434,7 @@ FREE (&tmpfname); } } + gpgme_data_release (plaintext); gpgme_release (ctx); } @@ -2404,6 +2486,7 @@ state_attach_puts (_("[-- END PGP SIGNED MESSAGE --]\n"), s); } + gpgme_data_release (armored_data); if (pgpout) { safe_fclose (&pgpout); @@ -2769,35 +2852,28 @@ s = "x"; else { - gpgme_user_id_t uid = NULL; - unsigned int i = 0; - - for (i = 0, uid = key->kobj->uids; uid && (i < key->idx); - i++, uid = uid->next) - ; - if (uid) - switch (uid->validity) - { - case GPGME_VALIDITY_UNDEFINED: - s = "q"; - break; - case GPGME_VALIDITY_NEVER: - s = "n"; - break; - case GPGME_VALIDITY_MARGINAL: - s = "m"; - break; - case GPGME_VALIDITY_FULL: - s = "f"; - break; - case GPGME_VALIDITY_ULTIMATE: - s = "u"; - break; - case GPGME_VALIDITY_UNKNOWN: - default: - s = "?"; - break; - } + switch (key->validity) + { + case GPGME_VALIDITY_UNDEFINED: + s = "q"; + break; + case GPGME_VALIDITY_NEVER: + s = "n"; + break; + case GPGME_VALIDITY_MARGINAL: + s = "m"; + break; + case GPGME_VALIDITY_FULL: + s = "f"; + break; + case GPGME_VALIDITY_ULTIMATE: + s = "u"; + break; + case GPGME_VALIDITY_UNKNOWN: + default: + s = "?"; + break; + } } snprintf (fmt, sizeof (fmt), "%%%sc", prefix); snprintf (dest, destlen, fmt, s? *s: 'B'); @@ -2842,7 +2918,7 @@ if ((r = mutt_strcasecmp ((*s)->uid, (*t)->uid))) return r > 0; else - return mutt_strcasecmp (crypt_keyid (*s), crypt_keyid (*t)) > 0; + return mutt_strcasecmp (crypt_fpr_or_lkeyid (*s), crypt_fpr_or_lkeyid (*t)) > 0; } static int crypt_compare_address (const void *a, const void *b) @@ -2859,7 +2935,7 @@ crypt_key_t **t = (crypt_key_t **) b; int r; - if ((r = mutt_strcasecmp (crypt_keyid (*s), crypt_keyid (*t)))) + if ((r = mutt_strcasecmp (crypt_fpr_or_lkeyid (*s), crypt_fpr_or_lkeyid (*t)))) return r > 0; else return mutt_strcasecmp ((*s)->uid, (*t)->uid) > 0; @@ -2910,10 +2986,8 @@ - ((*t)->flags & (KEYFLAG_RESTRICTIONS))))) return r > 0; - if ((*s)->kobj->uids) - ts = (*s)->kobj->uids->validity; - if ((*t)->kobj->uids) - tt = (*t)->kobj->uids->validity; + ts = (*s)->validity; + tt = (*t)->validity; if ((r = (tt - ts))) return r < 0; @@ -2935,7 +3009,7 @@ if ((r = mutt_strcasecmp ((*s)->uid, (*t)->uid))) return r > 0; - return (mutt_strcasecmp (crypt_keyid ((*s)), crypt_keyid ((*t)))) > 0; + return (mutt_strcasecmp (crypt_fpr_or_lkeyid ((*s)), crypt_fpr_or_lkeyid ((*t)))) > 0; }
