auto_mode is used by crypt_opportunistic_encrypt to determine whether
there are valid keys for all recipients of a message, without prompting
the user.
The patch wraps around prompts, and makes getkeybyaddr methods return a
valid key without prompting.
crypt_getkeybyaddr() seems to be a bit different from
pgp_getkeybyaddr(). In my testing, the gpgme method was NOT finding
a single key in cases where the classic pgp method was. To make
opportunistic_encrypt the most useful, I made both these methods return
a key if they found ANY valid keys.
The patch also enables a call to crypt_is_numerical_keyid() in
find_keys(), so that crypt-hooks can actually be checked without
prompting when gpgme is enabled. (The addition was patterned off of the
pgp_findKeys() function).
crypt-gpgme.c | 105 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
pgp.c | 42 +++++++++++++---------
pgp.h | 2 +-
pgpkey.c | 24 ++++++++++--
smime.c | 6 ++-
5 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
# HG changeset patch
# User Kevin McCarthy <ke...@8t8.us>
# Date 1363403034 25200
# Branch HEAD
# Node ID 1e48ca012c852879e46b94bd56d463e3db838831
# Parent 7082744ee06bb5388cb1de22147b20b210d06efc
Implement auto_mode in the find_keys methods.
auto_mode is used by crypt_opportunistic_encrypt to determine whether
there are valid keys for all recipients of a message, without prompting
the user.
The patch wraps around prompts, and makes getkeybyaddr methods return a
valid key without prompting.
crypt_getkeybyaddr() seems to be a bit different from
pgp_getkeybyaddr(). In my testing, the gpgme method was NOT finding
a single key in cases where the classic pgp method was. To make
opportunistic_encrypt the most useful, I made both these methods return
a key if they found ANY valid keys.
The patch also enables a call to crypt_is_numerical_keyid() in
find_keys(), so that crypt-hooks can actually be checked without
prompting when gpgme is enabled. (The addition was patterned off of the
pgp_findKeys() function).
diff --git a/crypt-gpgme.c b/crypt-gpgme.c
--- a/crypt-gpgme.c
+++ b/crypt-gpgme.c
@@ -3954,17 +3954,18 @@
FREE (&key_table);
set_option (OPTNEEDREDRAW);
return k;
}
static crypt_key_t *crypt_getkeybyaddr (ADDRESS * a, short abilities,
- unsigned int app, int *forced_valid)
+ unsigned int app, int *forced_valid,
+ int auto_mode)
{
ADDRESS *r, *p;
LIST *hints = NULL;
int weak = 0;
int invalid = 0;
int multi = 0;
int this_key_has_strong;
@@ -3979,17 +3980,18 @@
*forced_valid = 0;
if (a && a->mailbox)
hints = crypt_add_string_to_hints (hints, a->mailbox);
if (a && a->personal)
hints = crypt_add_string_to_hints (hints, a->personal);
- mutt_message (_("Looking for keys matching \"%s\"..."), a->mailbox);
+ if (! auto_mode )
+ mutt_message (_("Looking for keys matching \"%s\"..."), a->mailbox);
keys = get_candidates (hints, app, (abilities & KEYFLAG_CANSIGN) );
mutt_free_list (&hints);
if (!keys)
return NULL;
dprint (5, (debugfile, "crypt_getkeybyaddr: looking for %s <%s>.",
@@ -4054,17 +4056,24 @@
the_valid_key = tmp;
}
}
crypt_free_key (&keys);
if (matches)
{
- if (the_valid_key && !multi && !weak
+ if (auto_mode)
+ {
+ if (the_valid_key)
+ k = crypt_copy_key (the_valid_key);
+ else
+ k = NULL;
+ }
+ else if (the_valid_key && !multi && !weak
&& !(invalid && option (OPTPGPSHOWUNUSABLE)))
{
/*
* There was precisely one strong match on a valid ID, there
* were no valid keys with weak matches, and we aren't
* interested in seeing invalid keys.
*
* Proceed without asking the user.
@@ -4082,17 +4091,17 @@
}
else
k = NULL;
return k;
}
-static crypt_key_t *crypt_getkeybystr (char *p, short abilities,
+static crypt_key_t *crypt_getkeybystr (const char *p, short abilities,
unsigned int app, int *forced_valid)
{
LIST *hints = NULL;
crypt_key_t *keys;
crypt_key_t *matches = NULL;
crypt_key_t **matches_endp = &matches;
crypt_key_t *k;
@@ -4209,52 +4218,64 @@
}
/* This routine attempts to find the keyids of the recipients of a
message. It returns NULL if any of the keys can not be found.
If auto_mode is true, only keys that can be determined without
prompting will be used. */
static char *find_keys (ADDRESS *adrlist, unsigned int app, int auto_mode)
{
- char *keyID, *keylist = NULL, *t;
+ const char *keyID = NULL;
+ char *keylist = NULL, *t;
size_t keylist_size = 0;
size_t keylist_used = 0;
ADDRESS *addr = NULL;
ADDRESS *p, *q;
- crypt_key_t *k_info, *key;
+ crypt_key_t *k_info;
const char *fqdn = mutt_fqdn (1);
#if 0
*r_application = APPLICATION_PGP|APPLICATION_SMIME;
#endif
for (p = adrlist; p ; p = p->next)
{
char buf[LONG_STRING];
int forced_valid = 0;
q = p;
k_info = NULL;
if ((keyID = mutt_crypt_hook (p)) != NULL)
{
- int r;
- snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), _("Use keyID = \"%s\" for %s?"),
- keyID, p->mailbox);
- if ((r = mutt_yesorno (buf, M_YES)) == M_YES)
+ int r = M_NO;
+ if (! auto_mode)
{
+ snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), _("Use keyID = \"%s\" for %s?"),
+ keyID, p->mailbox);
+ r = mutt_yesorno (buf, M_YES);
+ }
+ if (auto_mode || (r == M_YES))
+ {
+ if (crypt_is_numerical_keyid (keyID))
+ {
+ if (strncmp (keyID, "0x", 2) == 0)
+ keyID += 2;
+ goto bypass_selection; /* you don't see this. */
+ }
+
/* check for e-mail address */
if ((t = strchr (keyID, '@')) &&
(addr = rfc822_parse_adrlist (NULL, keyID)))
{
if (fqdn)
rfc822_qualify (addr, fqdn);
q = addr;
}
- else
+ else if (! auto_mode)
{
#if 0
k_info = crypt_getkeybystr (keyID, KEYFLAG_CANENCRYPT,
*r_application, &forced_valid);
#else
k_info = crypt_getkeybystr (keyID, KEYFLAG_CANENCRYPT,
app, &forced_valid);
#endif
@@ -4263,58 +4284,62 @@
else if (r == -1)
{
FREE (&keylist);
rfc822_free_address (&addr);
return NULL;
}
}
- if (k_info == NULL
- && (k_info = crypt_getkeybyaddr (q, KEYFLAG_CANENCRYPT,
- app, &forced_valid)) == NULL)
+ if (k_info == NULL)
+ {
+ k_info = crypt_getkeybyaddr (q, KEYFLAG_CANENCRYPT,
+ app, &forced_valid, auto_mode);
+ }
+
+ if ((k_info == NULL) && (! auto_mode))
{
snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), _("Enter keyID for %s: "), q->mailbox);
- if ((key = crypt_ask_for_key (buf, q->mailbox,
- KEYFLAG_CANENCRYPT,
+ k_info = crypt_ask_for_key (buf, q->mailbox,
+ KEYFLAG_CANENCRYPT,
#if 0
- *r_application,
+ *r_application,
#else
- app,
+ app,
#endif
- &forced_valid)) == NULL)
- {
- FREE (&keylist);
- rfc822_free_address (&addr);
- return NULL;
- }
+ &forced_valid);
}
- else
- key = k_info;
-
- {
- const char *s = crypt_fpr (key);
+
+ if (k_info == NULL)
+ {
+ FREE (&keylist);
+ rfc822_free_address (&addr);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+
+ keyID = crypt_fpr (k_info);
#if 0
- if (key->flags & KEYFLAG_ISX509)
- *r_application &= ~APPLICATION_PGP;
- if (!(key->flags & KEYFLAG_ISX509))
- *r_application &= ~APPLICATION_SMIME;
+ if (k_info->flags & KEYFLAG_ISX509)
+ *r_application &= ~APPLICATION_PGP;
+ if (!(k_info->flags & KEYFLAG_ISX509))
+ *r_application &= ~APPLICATION_SMIME;
#endif
- keylist_size += mutt_strlen (s) + 4 + 1;
- safe_realloc (&keylist, keylist_size);
- sprintf (keylist + keylist_used, "%s0x%s%s", /* __SPRINTF_CHECKED__ */
- keylist_used ? " " : "", s,
- forced_valid? "!":"");
- }
+ bypass_selection:
+ keylist_size += mutt_strlen (keyID) + 4 + 1;
+ safe_realloc (&keylist, keylist_size);
+ sprintf (keylist + keylist_used, "%s0x%s%s", /* __SPRINTF_CHECKED__ */
+ keylist_used ? " " : "", keyID,
+ forced_valid? "!":"");
keylist_used = mutt_strlen (keylist);
- crypt_free_key (&key);
+ crypt_free_key (&k_info);
rfc822_free_address (&addr);
}
return (keylist);
}
char *pgp_gpgme_findkeys (ADDRESS *adrlist, int auto_mode)
{
return find_keys (adrlist, APPLICATION_PGP, auto_mode);
diff --git a/pgp.c b/pgp.c
--- a/pgp.c
+++ b/pgp.c
@@ -1139,86 +1139,94 @@
*/
char *pgp_findKeys (ADDRESS *adrlist, int auto_mode)
{
char *keyID, *keylist = NULL;
size_t keylist_size = 0;
size_t keylist_used = 0;
ADDRESS *addr = NULL;
ADDRESS *p, *q;
- pgp_key_t k_info = NULL, key = NULL;
+ pgp_key_t k_info = NULL;
const char *fqdn = mutt_fqdn (1);
for (p = adrlist; p ; p = p->next)
{
char buf[LONG_STRING];
q = p;
k_info = NULL;
if ((keyID = mutt_crypt_hook (p)) != NULL)
{
- int r;
- snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), _("Use keyID = \"%s\" for %s?"), keyID, p->mailbox);
- if ((r = mutt_yesorno (buf, M_YES)) == M_YES)
+ int r = M_NO;
+ if (! auto_mode)
+ {
+ snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), _("Use keyID = \"%s\" for %s?"), keyID, p->mailbox);
+ r = mutt_yesorno (buf, M_YES);
+ }
+ if (auto_mode || (r == M_YES))
{
if (crypt_is_numerical_keyid (keyID))
{
if (strncmp (keyID, "0x", 2) == 0)
keyID += 2;
goto bypass_selection; /* you don't see this. */
}
/* check for e-mail address */
if (strchr (keyID, '@') &&
(addr = rfc822_parse_adrlist (NULL, keyID)))
{
if (fqdn) rfc822_qualify (addr, fqdn);
q = addr;
}
- else
+ else if (! auto_mode)
+ {
k_info = pgp_getkeybystr (keyID, KEYFLAG_CANENCRYPT, PGP_PUBRING);
+ }
}
else if (r == -1)
{
FREE (&keylist);
rfc822_free_address (&addr);
return NULL;
}
}
if (k_info == NULL)
+ {
pgp_invoke_getkeys (q);
+ k_info = pgp_getkeybyaddr (q, KEYFLAG_CANENCRYPT, PGP_PUBRING, auto_mode);
+ }
- if (k_info == NULL && (k_info = pgp_getkeybyaddr (q, KEYFLAG_CANENCRYPT, PGP_PUBRING)) == NULL)
+ if ((k_info == NULL) && (! auto_mode))
{
snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), _("Enter keyID for %s: "), q->mailbox);
+ k_info = pgp_ask_for_key (buf, q->mailbox,
+ KEYFLAG_CANENCRYPT, PGP_PUBRING);
+ }
- if ((key = pgp_ask_for_key (buf, q->mailbox,
- KEYFLAG_CANENCRYPT, PGP_PUBRING)) == NULL)
- {
- FREE (&keylist);
- rfc822_free_address (&addr);
- return NULL;
- }
+ if (k_info == NULL)
+ {
+ FREE (&keylist);
+ rfc822_free_address (&addr);
+ return NULL;
}
- else
- key = k_info;
- keyID = pgp_keyid (key);
+ keyID = pgp_keyid (k_info);
bypass_selection:
keylist_size += mutt_strlen (keyID) + 4;
safe_realloc (&keylist, keylist_size);
sprintf (keylist + keylist_used, "%s0x%s", keylist_used ? " " : "", /* __SPRINTF_CHECKED__ */
keyID);
keylist_used = mutt_strlen (keylist);
- pgp_free_key (&key);
+ pgp_free_key (&k_info);
rfc822_free_address (&addr);
}
return (keylist);
}
/* Warning: "a" is no longer freed in this routine, you need
* to free it later. This is necessary for $fcc_attach. */
diff --git a/pgp.h b/pgp.h
--- a/pgp.h
+++ b/pgp.h
@@ -41,17 +41,17 @@
int pgp_decrypt_mime (FILE *, FILE **, BODY *, BODY **);
/* int pgp_string_matches_hint (const char *s, LIST * hints); */
/* pgp_key_t gpg_get_candidates (struct pgp_vinfo *, pgp_ring_t, LIST *); */
pgp_key_t pgp_ask_for_key (char *, char *, short, pgp_ring_t);
pgp_key_t pgp_get_candidates (pgp_ring_t, LIST *);
-pgp_key_t pgp_getkeybyaddr (ADDRESS *, short, pgp_ring_t);
+pgp_key_t pgp_getkeybyaddr (ADDRESS *, short, pgp_ring_t, int);
pgp_key_t pgp_getkeybystr (char *, short, pgp_ring_t);
char *pgp_findKeys (ADDRESS *adrlist, int auto_mode);
void pgp_forget_passphrase (void);
int pgp_application_pgp_handler (BODY *, STATE *);
int pgp_encrypted_handler (BODY *, STATE *);
void pgp_extract_keys_from_attachment_list (FILE * fp, int tag, BODY * top);
diff --git a/pgpkey.c b/pgpkey.c
--- a/pgpkey.c
+++ b/pgpkey.c
@@ -807,17 +807,18 @@
{
for (; p; p = p->next)
if (!p->next)
return &p->next;
return NULL;
}
-pgp_key_t pgp_getkeybyaddr (ADDRESS * a, short abilities, pgp_ring_t keyring)
+pgp_key_t pgp_getkeybyaddr (ADDRESS * a, short abilities, pgp_ring_t keyring,
+ int auto_mode)
{
ADDRESS *r, *p;
LIST *hints = NULL;
int multi = 0;
int match;
pgp_key_t keys, k, kn;
@@ -826,17 +827,18 @@
pgp_key_t *last = &matches;
pgp_uid_t *q;
if (a && a->mailbox)
hints = pgp_add_string_to_hints (hints, a->mailbox);
if (a && a->personal)
hints = pgp_add_string_to_hints (hints, a->personal);
- mutt_message (_("Looking for keys matching \"%s\"..."), a->mailbox);
+ if (! auto_mode )
+ mutt_message (_("Looking for keys matching \"%s\"..."), a->mailbox);
keys = pgp_get_candidates (keyring, hints);
mutt_free_list (&hints);
if (!keys)
return NULL;
dprint (5, (debugfile, "pgp_getkeybyaddr: looking for %s <%s>.",
@@ -890,37 +892,49 @@
last = pgp_get_lastp (k);
}
}
pgp_free_key (&keys);
if (matches)
{
- if (the_valid_key && !multi)
+ if (auto_mode)
+ {
+ if (the_valid_key)
+ {
+ pgp_remove_key (&matches, the_valid_key);
+ k = the_valid_key;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ k = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (the_valid_key && !multi)
{
/*
* There was precisely one strong match on a valid ID.
*
* Proceed without asking the user.
*/
pgp_remove_key (&matches, the_valid_key);
- pgp_free_key (&matches);
k = the_valid_key;
}
else
{
/*
* Else: Ask the user.
*/
if ((k = pgp_select_key (matches, a, NULL)))
pgp_remove_key (&matches, k);
- pgp_free_key (&matches);
}
+ pgp_free_key (&matches);
+
return k;
}
return NULL;
}
pgp_key_t pgp_getkeybystr (char *p, short abilities, pgp_ring_t keyring)
{
diff --git a/smime.c b/smime.c
--- a/smime.c
+++ b/smime.c
@@ -741,26 +741,28 @@
ADDRESS *p, *q;
for (p = adrlist; p ; p = p->next)
{
char buf[LONG_STRING];
q = p;
- if ((keyID = smime_get_field_from_db (q->mailbox, NULL, 1, 1)) == NULL)
+ keyID = smime_get_field_from_db (q->mailbox, NULL, 1, 1);
+ if ((keyID == NULL) && (! auto_mode))
{
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
_("Enter keyID for %s: "),
q->mailbox);
keyID = smime_ask_for_key(buf, q->mailbox, 1);
}
if(!keyID)
{
- mutt_message (_("No (valid) certificate found for %s."), q->mailbox);
+ if (! auto_mode)
+ mutt_message (_("No (valid) certificate found for %s."), q->mailbox);
FREE (&keylist);
return NULL;
}
keylist_size += mutt_strlen (keyID) + 2;
safe_realloc (&keylist, keylist_size);
sprintf (keylist + keylist_used, "%s\n", keyID); /* __SPRINTF_CHECKED__ */
keylist_used = mutt_strlen (keylist);
