On 07/26/2013 04:56 PM, Dmitrij D. Czarkoff wrote: > On Fri, Jul 26, 2013 at 08:36:17PM +0000, Christian Weisgerber wrote: >> (2) Since the NSA has preferential access to all sorts of vulnerabilities >> (if not outright backdoors) in IT equipment exported by American >> companies, it stands to reason that they are scared shitless of the >> reverse scenario. > In fact Chinese hardware could be banned just because of theoretic future > security risk. That's not to mention the fact that it may be banned because > the US backdoors can't be planted any more - workstations for > security-concious environments cost quite a lot, and banning some company from > this market would make a good point in negotiating such delicate matters. > >> (3) There is an ever-increasing amount of code running outside the >> control of the operating system. Have you looked at the remote >> management options of a plain office PC lately? CPU microcode >> updates from the BIOS? And what *does* all that SMM code do? It's >> all completely trustworthy and bug free, I'm sure. > FWIW the network cards' firmware would serve a better place for backdoor - > they interfere with network and do some cryptography the OS relies upon. > Don't forget disk drives. Hmmm, I've been reset, and we'rereading block 1. Let's give him hidden block 1.With a little tinkering,multiarchitecture takeovers.
Geoff Steckel
