On 5/16/2024 6:09 PM, John Levine wrote:
It appears that Mark Alley via mailop<mark.al...@tekmarc.com> said:
This claim stated that (and I'm quoting verbatim here), "/I forced many
ESPs to start failing SPF for any subdomain of a domain that has no
explicit SPF, and fails SPF at the *primary domain level* /(Context
note: when/v=spf1 -all /exists at the primary domain)".
Has anyone observed or heard of this SPF treewalk-esque evaluation logic
being used by Receivers when an empty SPF fail policy is used at the
organizational domain, but the subdomain used for SPF evaluation doesn't
exist?
I think he's confusing SPF and DMARC, or he's just confused.
If a domain has no SPF record, the SPF result is None, which is not
Pass, so in some contexts (DMARC checks) it acts like fail. This
should not surprise anyone.
R's,
John
I'm of the same opinion, and this context is specifically excluding
DMARC. Which itself is even yet more confusing as to the purpose of this
proposed "problem" email scenario that an authentication test was
actually designed for. I don't see what it's supposed to prove.
- Mark Alley
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