Hey all, got a dubious claim I read today that's somewhat of a head-scratcher.

Let's lay out the scenario.

 * The following DNS answers are returned when queried (pseudocode):
     o domain.com IN TXT "v=spf1 -all"
     o test.domain.com IN TXT  - NXDOMAIN
     o _dmarc.test.domain.com IN TXT - NXDOMAIN
     o _dmarc.domain.com IN TXT - NXDOMAIN

 * An email is sent with the RFC5321.mailfrom and RFC5322.from
   "t...@test.domain.com".
 * The email is not signed with DKIM.
 * The HELO FQDN has an SPF record with the corresponding MTA's IP in it.

This claim stated that (and I'm quoting verbatim here), "/I forced many ESPs to start failing SPF for any subdomain of a domain that has no explicit SPF, and fails SPF at the *primary domain level* /(Context note: when/v=spf1 -all /exists at the primary domain)".

Has anyone observed or heard of this SPF treewalk-esque evaluation logic being used by Receivers when an empty SPF fail policy is used at the organizational domain, but the subdomain used for SPF evaluation doesn't exist?


- Mark Alley

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