Commit 92ad19559ea9 ("integrity: Do not load MOK and MOKx when secure
boot be disabled") utilizes arch_ima_get_secureboot() to perform a
secure boot status check before loading the Machine Owner Key (MOK).
However, only when CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT=y can this
function be functional, while this config has nothing to do with secure
boot or MOK loading.

Given that arch_ima_get_secureboot() is just a helper to retrieve info
about secure boot via EFI and doesn't necessarily be a part of IMA,
rename it to arch_integrity_get_secureboot(), decouple its functionality
from IMA and extract it to be a integrity subsystem helper, so that both
certificate loading and IMA can make use of it.

Compile-tested on powerpc, s390 and x86, with CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY=n
and =y based on defconfig and allmodconfig.

Signed-off-by: GONG Ruiqi <gongrui...@huawei.com>
---

v2:
- Fix compile errors for CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY=n on s390 & powerpc

 arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile                  |  3 +-
 arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c                |  5 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/Makefile                     |  2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c                   |  5 +-
 include/linux/ima.h                           |  6 ---
 include/linux/integrity.h                     |  1 +
 security/integrity/Makefile                   |  3 +-
 security/integrity/ima/Makefile               |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c         |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c              | 47 +-----------------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c             |  2 +-
 security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c |  2 +-
 security/integrity/secureboot.c               | 48 +++++++++++++++++++
 13 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/secureboot.c

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile
index fb2b95267022..4d5e3c9dde93 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile
@@ -168,7 +168,8 @@ ifneq ($(CONFIG_PPC_POWERNV)$(CONFIG_PPC_SVM),)
 obj-y                          += ucall.o
 endif
 
-obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT)  += secure_boot.o ima_arch.o secvar-ops.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_IMA)              += ima_arch.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT)  += secure_boot.o secvar-ops.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECVAR_SYSFS) += secvar-sysfs.o
 
 # Disable GCOV, KCOV & sanitizers in odd or sensitive code
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
index b7029beed847..2cb248a88eeb 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
@@ -5,9 +5,10 @@
  */
 
 #include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <linux/integrity.h>
 #include <asm/secure_boot.h>
 
-bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
+bool arch_integrity_get_secureboot(void)
 {
        return is_ppc_secureboot_enabled();
 }
@@ -56,6 +57,7 @@ static const char *const secure_and_trusted_rules[] = {
        NULL
 };
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
 /*
  * Returns the relevant IMA arch-specific policies based on the system secure
  * boot state.
@@ -76,3 +78,4 @@ const char *const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
 
        return NULL;
 }
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/Makefile b/arch/s390/kernel/Makefile
index ea5ed6654050..961943cbf283 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/Makefile
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL)      += jump_label.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE)       += machine_kexec_file.o kexec_image.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE)       += kexec_elf.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CERT_STORE)       += cert_store.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT)   += ima_arch.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_IMA)              += ima_arch.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS)      += perf_event.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS)      += perf_cpum_cf.o perf_cpum_sf.o
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c
index f3c3e6e1c5d3..a69199afb286 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c
@@ -1,14 +1,17 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 
 #include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <linux/integrity.h>
 #include <asm/boot_data.h>
 
-bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
+bool arch_integrity_get_secureboot(void)
 {
        return ipl_secure_flag;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
 const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
 {
        return NULL;
 }
+#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 8e29cb4e6a01..9faf3b964314 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -72,14 +72,8 @@ int __init ima_get_kexec_buffer(void **addr, size_t *size);
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
-extern bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void);
 extern const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void);
 #else
-static inline bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
-{
-       return false;
-}
-
 static inline const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
 {
        return NULL;
diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h
index f5842372359b..4bc81fe4253e 100644
--- a/include/linux/integrity.h
+++ b/include/linux/integrity.h
@@ -61,5 +61,6 @@ integrity_inode_attrs_changed(const struct 
integrity_inode_attributes *attrs,
                !inode_eq_iversion(inode, attrs->version));
 }
 
+extern bool arch_integrity_get_secureboot(void);
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H */
diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile
index 92b63039c654..0770c6554a8f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/Makefile
@@ -11,7 +11,8 @@ integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o
 integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += digsig_asymmetric.o
 integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) += 
platform_certs/platform_keyring.o
 integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) += 
platform_certs/machine_keyring.o
-integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \
+integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS) += secureboot.o \
+                                     platform_certs/efi_parser.o \
                                      platform_certs/load_uefi.o \
                                      platform_certs/keyring_handler.o
 integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_IPL_KEYS) += platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index b376d38b4ee6..f81be17e25a8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -16,5 +16,5 @@ ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += 
ima_asymmetric_keys.o
 ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS) += ima_queue_keys.o
 
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_EFI),y)
-ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT) += ima_efi.o
+ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT) += ima_efi.o ../secureboot.o
 endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c 
b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index f435eff4667f..41bece645348 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ core_param(ima_appraise, ima_appraise_cmdline_default, charp, 
0);
 void __init ima_appraise_parse_cmdline(void)
 {
        const char *str = ima_appraise_cmdline_default;
-       bool sb_state = arch_ima_get_secureboot();
+       bool sb_state = arch_integrity_get_secureboot();
        int appraisal_state = ima_appraise;
 
        if (!str)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
index 138029bfcce1..fcbc0727469e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
@@ -2,52 +2,9 @@
 /*
  * Copyright (C) 2018 IBM Corporation
  */
-#include <linux/efi.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
-#include <asm/efi.h>
-
-#ifndef arch_ima_efi_boot_mode
-#define arch_ima_efi_boot_mode efi_secureboot_mode_unset
-#endif
-
-static enum efi_secureboot_mode get_sb_mode(void)
-{
-       enum efi_secureboot_mode mode;
-
-       if (!efi_rt_services_supported(EFI_RT_SUPPORTED_GET_VARIABLE)) {
-               pr_info("ima: secureboot mode unknown, no efi\n");
-               return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
-       }
-
-       mode = efi_get_secureboot_mode(efi.get_variable);
-       if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_disabled)
-               pr_info("ima: secureboot mode disabled\n");
-       else if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unknown)
-               pr_info("ima: secureboot mode unknown\n");
-       else
-               pr_info("ima: secureboot mode enabled\n");
-       return mode;
-}
-
-bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
-{
-       static enum efi_secureboot_mode sb_mode;
-       static bool initialized;
-
-       if (!initialized && efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
-               sb_mode = arch_ima_efi_boot_mode;
-
-               if (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unset)
-                       sb_mode = get_sb_mode();
-               initialized = true;
-       }
-
-       if (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_enabled)
-               return true;
-       else
-               return false;
-}
+#include <linux/integrity.h>
 
 /* secureboot arch rules */
 static const char * const sb_arch_rules[] = {
@@ -67,7 +24,7 @@ static const char * const sb_arch_rules[] = {
 
 const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
 {
-       if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
+       if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) && 
arch_integrity_get_secureboot()) {
                if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG))
                        set_module_sig_enforced();
                if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG))
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c 
b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index f99ab1a3b0f0..9974d89f3eca 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -899,7 +899,7 @@ static int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool 
contents)
        switch (id) {
        case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE:
                if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG)
-                   && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
+                   && arch_integrity_get_secureboot()) {
                        pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a 
file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n");
                        return -EACCES;
                }
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c 
b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
index d1fdd113450a..3042a0c536d6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void)
        }
 
        /* the MOK/MOKx can not be trusted when secure boot is disabled */
-       if (!arch_ima_get_secureboot())
+       if (!arch_integrity_get_secureboot())
                return 0;
 
        mokx = get_cert_list(L"MokListXRT", &mok_var, &mokxsize, &status);
diff --git a/security/integrity/secureboot.c b/security/integrity/secureboot.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5c50f8be6053
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/secureboot.c
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2025 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
+ */
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/integrity.h>
+
+#include <asm/efi.h>
+
+#ifndef arch_integrity_efi_boot_mode
+#define arch_integrity_efi_boot_mode efi_secureboot_mode_unset
+#endif
+
+static enum efi_secureboot_mode get_sb_mode(void)
+{
+       enum efi_secureboot_mode mode;
+
+       if (!efi_rt_services_supported(EFI_RT_SUPPORTED_GET_VARIABLE)) {
+               pr_info("integrity: secureboot mode unknown, no efi\n");
+               return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
+       }
+
+       mode = efi_get_secureboot_mode(efi.get_variable);
+       if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_disabled)
+               pr_info("integrity: secureboot mode disabled\n");
+       else if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unknown)
+               pr_info("integrity: secureboot mode unknown\n");
+       else
+               pr_info("integrity: secureboot mode enabled\n");
+       return mode;
+}
+
+bool __weak arch_integrity_get_secureboot(void)
+{
+       static enum efi_secureboot_mode sb_mode;
+       static bool initialized;
+
+       if (!initialized && efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
+               sb_mode = arch_integrity_efi_boot_mode;
+
+               if (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unset)
+                       sb_mode = get_sb_mode();
+               initialized = true;
+       }
+
+       return sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_enabled;
+}
-- 
2.25.1


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