On Wed, 2025-05-14 at 11:09 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Tue, 2025-04-29 at 15:04 +0200, Thomas Weißschuh wrote:
> > When configuration settings are disabled the guarded functions are
> > defined as empty stubs, so the check is unnecessary.
> > The specific configuration option for set_module_sig_enforced() is
> > about to change and removing the checks avoids some later churn.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <li...@weissschuh.net>
> > 
> > ---
> > This patch is not strictly necessary right now, but makes looking for
> > usages of CONFIG_MODULE_SIG easier.
> > ---
> >  security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c | 6 ++----
> >  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c 
> > b/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
> > index
> > 138029bfcce1e40ef37700c15e30909f6e9b4f2d..a35dd166ad47beb4a7d46cc3e8fc604f57e03ecb
> > 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
> > @@ -68,10 +68,8 @@ static const char * const sb_arch_rules[] = {
> >  const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
> >  {
> >     if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
> > -           if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG))
> > -                   set_module_sig_enforced();
> > -           if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG))
> > -                   set_kexec_sig_enforced();
> > +           set_module_sig_enforced();
> > +           set_kexec_sig_enforced();
> >             return sb_arch_rules;
> 
> Hi Thomas,
> 
> I'm just getting to looking at this patch set.  Sorry for the delay.
> 
> Testing whether CONFIG_MODULE_SIG and CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG are configured gives 
> priority
> to them, rather than to the IMA support.  Without any other changes, both 
> signature
> verifications would be enforced.  Is that the intention?

Never mind, got it.

Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zo...@linux.ibm.com>

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