On Tue, 2025-04-29 at 15:04 +0200, Thomas Weißschuh wrote:
> When configuration settings are disabled the guarded functions are
> defined as empty stubs, so the check is unnecessary.
> The specific configuration option for set_module_sig_enforced() is
> about to change and removing the checks avoids some later churn.
>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <li...@weissschuh.net>
>
> ---
> This patch is not strictly necessary right now, but makes looking for
> usages of CONFIG_MODULE_SIG easier.
> ---
> security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c | 6 ++----
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
> b/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
> index
> 138029bfcce1e40ef37700c15e30909f6e9b4f2d..a35dd166ad47beb4a7d46cc3e8fc604f57e03ecb
> 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
> @@ -68,10 +68,8 @@ static const char * const sb_arch_rules[] = {
> const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
> {
> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
> - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG))
> - set_module_sig_enforced();
> - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG))
> - set_kexec_sig_enforced();
> + set_module_sig_enforced();
> + set_kexec_sig_enforced();
> return sb_arch_rules;
Hi Thomas,
I'm just getting to looking at this patch set. Sorry for the delay.
Testing whether CONFIG_MODULE_SIG and CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG are configured gives
priority
to them, rather than to the IMA support. Without any other changes, both
signature
verifications would be enforced. Is that the intention?
Mimi
> }
> return NULL;
>
