On Fri, May 9, 2025 at 11:39 AM <patchwork-bot+netdev...@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> Hello:
>
> This series was applied to bpf/bpf-next.git (master)
> by Alexei Starovoitov <a...@kernel.org>:
>
> On Thu, 1 May 2025 09:35:51 +0200 you wrote:
> > This improves the expressiveness of unprivileged BPF by inserting
> > speculation barriers instead of rejecting the programs.
> >
> > The approach was previously presented at LPC'24 [1] and RAID'24 [2].
> >
> > To mitigate the Spectre v1 (PHT) vulnerability, the kernel rejects
> > potentially-dangerous unprivileged BPF programs as of
> > commit 9183671af6db ("bpf: Fix leakage under speculation on mispredicted
> > branches"). In [2], we have analyzed 364 object files from open source
> > projects (Linux Samples and Selftests, BCC, Loxilb, Cilium, libbpf
> > Examples, Parca, and Prevail) and found that this affects 31% to 54% of
> > programs.
> >
> > [...]
>
> Here is the summary with links:
> - [bpf-next,v3,01/11] selftests/bpf: Fix caps for __xlated/jited_unpriv
> https://git.kernel.org/bpf/bpf-next/c/cf15cdc0f0f3
> - [bpf-next,v3,02/11] bpf: Move insn if/else into do_check_insn()
> (no matching commit)
Applied the first patch only.
Waiting for respin of the rest.
