On Sun, Apr 27, 2025 at 08:41:38PM +0800, Herbert Xu wrote: > On Sun, Apr 27, 2025 at 05:35:14AM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > > > > Well, barely a day and you've already ruined my patch series. Now instead > > of a > > clean design where the crypto_shash API is built on top of the normal > > library > > API (sha256_update() etc.), there's now a special low-level API > > "sha256_choose_blocks()" just for shash that it's built on top of instead, > > for > > no good reason. You're also still pushing your broken > > BLOCK_HASH_UPDATE_BLOCKS > > macro that doesn't work with size_t, and putting my name on your broken code > > that uses it. > > Your design is unacceptable because you're forcing the partial block > handling on shash where it's not needed,
Excuse me? It's the other way around. In my version the partial block handling is only in the library, not shash. In your version you've forced it into the shash layer, even though the library does it already. I understand that you've added support for partial block handling to crypto/shash.c and you want to feel like your work is useful, but in this case it's not, since the libray has to handle arbitrary-length inputs anyway. > just as you're forcing the hardirq support on everything. If you want crypto_shash to warn on hardirq usage you should just put a WARN_ON(in_hardirq()) in crypto_shash_*(), which will actually achieve that. Not add a shash-specific non-hardirq-safe low-level API to the library that can silently corrupt random tasks' SIMD registers on production systems. - Eric
