On Mon, Oct 22, 2018 at 10:48:35AM +0530, Bharata B Rao wrote:
> A secure guest will share some of its pages with hypervisor (Eg. virtio
> bounce buffers etc). Support shared pages in HMM driver.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Bharata B Rao <bhar...@linux.ibm.com>

Comments below...

> ---
>  arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>  1 file changed, 65 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c 
> b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c
> index a2ee3163a312..09b8e19b7605 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_hmm.c
> @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ struct kvmppc_hmm_page_pvt {
>       struct hlist_head *hmm_hash;
>       unsigned int lpid;
>       unsigned long gpa;
> +     bool skip_page_out;
>  };
>  
>  struct kvmppc_hmm_migrate_args {
> @@ -278,6 +279,65 @@ static unsigned long kvmppc_gpa_to_hva(struct kvm *kvm, 
> unsigned long gpa,
>       return hva;
>  }
>  
> +/*
> + * Shares the page with HV, thus making it a normal page.
> + *
> + * - If the page is already secure, then provision a new page and share
> + * - If the page is a normal page, share the existing page
> + *
> + * In the former case, uses the HMM fault handler to release the HMM page.
> + */
> +static unsigned long
> +kvmppc_share_page(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa,
> +               unsigned long addr, unsigned long page_shift)
> +{
> +
> +     int ret;
> +     struct hlist_head *list, *hmm_hash;
> +     unsigned int lpid = kvm->arch.lpid;
> +     unsigned long flags;
> +     struct kvmppc_hmm_pfn_entry *p;
> +     struct page *hmm_page, *page;
> +     struct kvmppc_hmm_page_pvt *pvt;
> +     unsigned long pfn;
> +
> +     /*
> +      * First check if the requested page has already been given to
> +      * UV as a secure page. If so, ensure that we don't issue a
> +      * UV_PAGE_OUT but instead directly send the page
> +      */
> +     spin_lock_irqsave(&kvmppc_hmm_lock, flags);
> +     hmm_hash = kvm->arch.hmm_hash;
> +     list = &hmm_hash[kvmppc_hmm_pfn_hash_fn(gpa)];
> +     hlist_for_each_entry(p, list, hlist) {
> +             if (p->addr == gpa) {
> +                     hmm_page = pfn_to_page(p->hmm_pfn);
> +                     get_page(hmm_page); /* TODO: Necessary ? */
> +                     pvt = (struct kvmppc_hmm_page_pvt *)
> +                             hmm_devmem_page_get_drvdata(hmm_page);
> +                     pvt->skip_page_out = true;
> +                     put_page(hmm_page);
> +                     break;
> +             }
> +     }
> +     spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kvmppc_hmm_lock, flags);
> +
> +     ret = get_user_pages_fast(addr, 1, 0, &page);

Why are we calling this with write==0?  Surely in general the secure
guest will expect to be able to write to the shared page?

Also, in general get_user_pages_fast isn't sufficient to translate a
host virtual address (derived from a guest real address) into a pfn.
See for example hva_to_pfn() in virt/kvm/kvm_main.c and the things it
does to cope with the various cases that one can hit.  I can imagine
in future that the secure guest might want to establish a shared
mapping to a PCI device, for instance.

> +     if (ret != 1)
> +             return H_PARAMETER;
> +
> +     pfn = page_to_pfn(page);
> +     if (is_zero_pfn(pfn)) {
> +             put_page(page);
> +             return H_SUCCESS;
> +     }

The ultravisor still needs a page to map into the guest in this case,
doesn't it?  What's the point of returning without giving the
ultravisor a page to use?

> +
> +     ret = uv_page_in(lpid, pfn << page_shift, gpa, 0, page_shift);
> +     put_page(page);
> +
> +     return (ret == U_SUCCESS) ? H_SUCCESS : H_PARAMETER;
> +}
> +
>  /*
>   * Move page from normal memory to secure memory.
>   */
> @@ -300,8 +360,8 @@ kvmppc_h_svm_page_in(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa,
>               return H_PARAMETER;
>       end = addr + (1UL << page_shift);
>  
> -     if (flags)
> -             return H_P2;
> +     if (flags & H_PAGE_IN_SHARED)
> +             return kvmppc_share_page(kvm, gpa, addr, page_shift);

Would be best to fail if any unknown flags are set, I would think.

>  
>       args.hmm_hash = kvm->arch.hmm_hash;
>       args.lpid = kvm->arch.lpid;
> @@ -349,8 +409,9 @@ kvmppc_hmm_fault_migrate_alloc_and_copy(struct 
> vm_area_struct *vma,
>              hmm_devmem_page_get_drvdata(spage);
>  
>       pfn = page_to_pfn(dpage);
> -     ret = uv_page_out(pvt->lpid, pfn << PAGE_SHIFT,
> -                       pvt->gpa, 0, PAGE_SHIFT);
> +     if (!pvt->skip_page_out)
> +             ret = uv_page_out(pvt->lpid, pfn << PAGE_SHIFT,
> +                               pvt->gpa, 0, PAGE_SHIFT);
>       if (ret == U_SUCCESS)
>               *dst_pfn = migrate_pfn(pfn) | MIGRATE_PFN_LOCKED;
>  }
> -- 
> 2.17.1

Paul.

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