On Wed, Dec 04, 2024 at 07:59:11AM -0800, Jordan Rome wrote:
> In cases where we want a stable way to observe/trace
> cap_capable (e.g. protection from inlining and API updates)
> add a tracepoint that passes:
> - The credentials used
> - The user namespace of the resource being accessed
> - The user namespace in which the credential provides the
> capability to access the targeted resource
> - The capability to check for
> - The return value of the check
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jordan Rome <li...@jordanrome.com>

Thanks, applied to caps-next.

> ---
>  MAINTAINERS                       |  1 +
>  include/trace/events/capability.h | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  security/commoncap.c              | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------
>  3 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 include/trace/events/capability.h
> 
> diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
> index 1e930c7a58b1..33fde7f660d0 100644
> --- a/MAINTAINERS
> +++ b/MAINTAINERS
> @@ -5147,6 +5147,7 @@ M:      Serge Hallyn <se...@hallyn.com>
>  L:   linux-security-mod...@vger.kernel.org
>  S:   Supported
>  F:   include/linux/capability.h
> +F:   include/trace/events/capability.h
>  F:   include/uapi/linux/capability.h
>  F:   kernel/capability.c
>  F:   security/commoncap.c
> diff --git a/include/trace/events/capability.h 
> b/include/trace/events/capability.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..17340257946c
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/trace/events/capability.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> +#undef TRACE_SYSTEM
> +#define TRACE_SYSTEM capability
> +
> +#if !defined(_TRACE_CAPABILITY_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ)
> +#define _TRACE_CAPABILITY_H
> +
> +#include <linux/cred.h>
> +#include <linux/tracepoint.h>
> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
> +
> +/**
> + * cap_capable - called after it's determined if a task has a particular
> + * effective capability
> + *
> + * @cred: The credentials used
> + * @target_ns: The user namespace of the resource being accessed
> + * @capable_ns: The user namespace in which the credential provides the
> + *              capability to access the targeted resource.
> + *              This will be NULL if ret is not 0.
> + * @cap: The capability to check for
> + * @ret: The return value of the check: 0 if it does, -ve if it does not
> + *
> + * Allows to trace calls to cap_capable in commoncap.c
> + */
> +TRACE_EVENT(cap_capable,
> +
> +     TP_PROTO(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *target_ns,
> +             const struct user_namespace *capable_ns, int cap, int ret),
> +
> +     TP_ARGS(cred, target_ns, capable_ns, cap, ret),
> +
> +     TP_STRUCT__entry(
> +             __field(const struct cred *, cred)
> +             __field(struct user_namespace *, target_ns)
> +             __field(const struct user_namespace *, capable_ns)
> +             __field(int, cap)
> +             __field(int, ret)
> +     ),
> +
> +     TP_fast_assign(
> +             __entry->cred       = cred;
> +             __entry->target_ns    = target_ns;
> +             __entry->capable_ns = ret == 0 ? capable_ns : NULL;
> +             __entry->cap        = cap;
> +             __entry->ret        = ret;
> +     ),
> +
> +     TP_printk("cred %p, target_ns %p, capable_ns %p, cap %d, ret %d",
> +             __entry->cred, __entry->target_ns, __entry->capable_ns, 
> __entry->cap,
> +             __entry->ret)
> +);
> +
> +#endif /* _TRACE_CAPABILITY_H */
> +
> +/* This part must be outside protection */
> +#include <trace/define_trace.h>
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index cefad323a0b1..7b6984b27127 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -27,6 +27,9 @@
>  #include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h>
>  #include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
> 
> +#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
> +#include <trace/events/capability.h>
> +
>  /*
>   * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
>   * !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities.
> @@ -50,24 +53,24 @@ static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname)
>  }
> 
>  /**
> - * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective 
> capability
> + * cap_capable_helper - Determine whether a task has a particular effective
> + * capability.
>   * @cred: The credentials to use
> - * @targ_ns:  The user namespace in which we need the capability
> + * @target_ns:  The user namespace of the resource being accessed
> + * @cred_ns:  The user namespace of the credentials
>   * @cap: The capability to check for
> - * @opts: Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h
>   *
>   * Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst
>   * its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not.
>   *
> - * NOTE WELL: cap_has_capability() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
> - * and has_capability() functions.  That is, it has the reverse semantics:
> - * cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
> - * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
> + * See cap_capable for more details.
>   */
> -int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
> -             int cap, unsigned int opts)
> +static inline int cap_capable_helper(const struct cred *cred,
> +                                  struct user_namespace *target_ns,
> +                                  const struct user_namespace *cred_ns,
> +                                  int cap)
>  {
> -     struct user_namespace *ns = targ_ns;
> +     struct user_namespace *ns = target_ns;
> 
>       /* See if cred has the capability in the target user namespace
>        * by examining the target user namespace and all of the target
> @@ -75,21 +78,21 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct 
> user_namespace *targ_ns,
>        */
>       for (;;) {
>               /* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */
> -             if (ns == cred->user_ns)
> +             if (likely(ns == cred_ns))
>                       return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : 
> -EPERM;
> 
>               /*
>                * If we're already at a lower level than we're looking for,
>                * we're done searching.
>                */
> -             if (ns->level <= cred->user_ns->level)
> +             if (ns->level <= cred_ns->level)
>                       return -EPERM;
> 
>               /*
>                * The owner of the user namespace in the parent of the
>                * user namespace has all caps.
>                */
> -             if ((ns->parent == cred->user_ns) && uid_eq(ns->owner, 
> cred->euid))
> +             if ((ns->parent == cred_ns) && uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid))
>                       return 0;
> 
>               /*
> @@ -102,6 +105,31 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct 
> user_namespace *targ_ns,
>       /* We never get here */
>  }
> 
> +/**
> + * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective 
> capability
> + * @cred: The credentials to use
> + * @target_ns:  The user namespace of the resource being accessed
> + * @cap: The capability to check for
> + * @opts: Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h (unused)
> + *
> + * Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst
> + * its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not.
> + *
> + * NOTE WELL: cap_has_capability() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
> + * and has_capability() functions.  That is, it has the reverse semantics:
> + * cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
> + * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
> + */
> +int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *target_ns,
> +             int cap, unsigned int opts)
> +{
> +     const struct user_namespace *cred_ns = cred->user_ns;
> +     int ret = cap_capable_helper(cred, target_ns, cred_ns, cap);
> +
> +     trace_cap_capable(cred, target_ns, cred_ns, cap, ret);
> +     return ret;
> +}
> +
>  /**
>   * cap_settime - Determine whether the current process may set the system 
> clock
>   * @ts: The time to set
> --
> 2.43.5

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