On 15-05-20 08:56:21, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>
> Would it make more sense to permit X.509 chains to be loaded into the keyring
> instead if we actually need that feature? IOW, let userspace (or early
> initramfs stuff) extend our keyring trust to intermediate certs that validly
> chain to already-trusted things? I think that a reasonable design goal would
> be that everything overcomplicated that's involved should be optional, and
> moving toward embedding PKCS#7 signatures in the modules themselves does the
> other direction?
This is similar to what i am doing right now - create CA hierarchy so we can
have something like:
+-> KeyB
|
RootCA ---> CertA ---> CertB ---> CertC ---> KeyC
|
+-> CertA' ---> KeyA"
The RootCA may be the one whose private key was used to sign the modules and
all
downstream certificates are either directly signed by it or one of the others.
Not all of the infrastructure is in the mainline kernel, but this can easily be
rectified.
Now, as Mimi pointed out this scheme is flawed and should be used with care if
at all. Revoking certificates is always a PITA. Being valid for one year only
adds to the fun.
Petko
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