On Tue, 24 Mar 2015 11:46:32 -0400 Sanidhya Kashyap <sanidhya.gat...@gmail.com>
wrote:
> The trusted extended attributes are only visible to the process which hvae
> CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability but the check is missing in ocfs2 xattr_handler
> trusted list. The check is important because this will be used for
> implementing
> mechanisms in the userspace for which other ordinary processes should not
> have access to.
>
> ...
>
> --- a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
> +++ b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
> @@ -7326,6 +7326,9 @@ static size_t ocfs2_xattr_trusted_list(struct dentry
> *dentry, char *list,
> const size_t prefix_len = XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN;
> const size_t total_len = prefix_len + name_len + 1;
>
> + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + return 0;
> +
> if (list && total_len <= list_size) {
> memcpy(list, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX, prefix_len);
> memcpy(list + prefix_len, name, name_len);
Ouch. Won't this break existing userspace?
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