On Sun, Jan 04, 2015 at 09:18:59AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Jan 4, 2015 8:11 AM, "Jiri Olsa" <jo...@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, Dec 30, 2014 at 08:03:27PM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > > On Thu, Dec 25, 2014 at 07:48:28AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > > > On a quick look, there are plenty of other bugs in there besides just
> > > > the stack pointer issue. The ABI check that uses TIF_IA32 in the perf
> > > > core is completely wrong. TIF_IA32 may be equal to the actual
> > > > userspace bitness by luck, but, if so, that's more or less just luck.
> > > > And there's a user_mode test that should be user_mode_vm.
> > > >
> > > > Also, it's not just sp that's wrong. There are various places that
> > > > you can interrupt in which many of the registers have confusing
> > > > locations. You could try using the cfi unwind data, but that's
> > > > unlikely to work for regs like cs and ss, and, during context switch,
> > > > this has very little chance of working.
> > > >
> > > > What's the point of this feature? Honestly, my suggestion would be to
> > > > delete it instead of trying to fix it. It's also not clear to me that
> > > > there aren't serious security problems here -- it's entirely possible
> > > > for sensitive *kernel* values to and up in task_pt_regs at certain
> > > > times, and if you run during context switch and there's no code to
> > > > suppress this dump during context switch, then you could be showing
> > > > regs that belong to the wrong task.
> > >
> > > Of course the people who actually wrote the code are not on CC :/
> > >
> > > There's two users of this iirc;
> > >
> > > 1) the dwarf stack unwinder thingy, which basically dumps the userspace
> > > regs and the top of userspace stack on 'event'.
> >
> > looks like this solves the issue I was trying to fix
> > long time ago:
> > http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=134934717011451&w=2
> >
> > this seems a lot simpler ;-) I'll test..
>
> I suspect that, if it works, then it's pure luck.
> (task)->thread.usersp in KSTK_ESP is bogus -- your code was more
> accurate.
>
> I think we should seriously consider making use of this feature by
> non-root users require an explicit sysctl. Sending values to user
> code that are, at best, free of sensitive kernel data most of the time
> is IMO inappropriate for an unprivileged API.
>
> I'm currently working on a patch to try to clean this up better.
ook.. well FWIW I tested and if I used KSTK_ESP as a perf user stack
pointer (attached patch) I've got all callchains resolved properly,
as when I tested my original patch
NOTE the patch from Chenggang Qin isnt enough to fix my issue for perf
dwarf unwind, I needed to use attached change
I'd be happy to test any change you make for this,
because this has been pain for a long time :-\
thanks,
jirka
---
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/perf_regs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/perf_regs.c
index 5da8df8303cf..eb7c385a6f8e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/perf_regs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/perf_regs.c
@@ -66,6 +66,11 @@ u64 perf_reg_value(struct pt_regs *regs, int idx)
return regs_get_register(regs, pt_regs_offset[idx]);
}
+unsigned long arch_perf_user_stack_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ return KSTK_ESP(current);
+}
+
#define REG_RESERVED (~((1ULL << PERF_REG_X86_MAX) - 1ULL))
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index af0a5ba4e21d..d99236173f3b 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -4486,6 +4486,19 @@ static void perf_sample_regs_intr(struct perf_regs
*regs_intr,
regs_intr->abi = perf_reg_abi(current);
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_PERF_USER_STACK_DUMP
+unsigned long __weak arch_perf_user_stack_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ return user_stack_pointer(regs);
+}
+
+static unsigned long perf_user_stack_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ return arch_perf_user_stack_pointer(regs);
+}
+#else
+#define perf_user_stack_pointer(regs) 0
+#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_PERF_USER_STACK_DUMP */
/*
* Get remaining task size from user stack pointer.
diff --git a/kernel/events/internal.h b/kernel/events/internal.h
index 569b218782ad..b85e4fd52980 100644
--- a/kernel/events/internal.h
+++ b/kernel/events/internal.h
@@ -180,19 +180,17 @@ static inline void put_recursion_context(int *recursion,
int rctx)
}
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_PERF_USER_STACK_DUMP
+unsigned long arch_perf_user_stack_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs);
+
static inline bool arch_perf_have_user_stack_dump(void)
{
return true;
}
-
-#define perf_user_stack_pointer(regs) user_stack_pointer(regs)
#else
static inline bool arch_perf_have_user_stack_dump(void)
{
return false;
}
-
-#define perf_user_stack_pointer(regs) 0
#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_PERF_USER_STACK_DUMP */
#endif /* _KERNEL_EVENTS_INTERNAL_H */
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