On Wed, Oct 02, 2013 at 02:39:53PM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote: > - then there are timing attacks, and someone having access to a PMU > context and who can trigger this SHA1 computation arbitrarily in task > local context can run very accurate and low noise timing attacks... > > I don't think the kernel's sha_transform() is hardened against timing > attacks, it's performance optimized so it has variable execution time > highly dependent on plaintext input - which leaks information about the > plaintext.
Typical user doesn't have enough priv to profile kernel space; once you do you also have enough priv to see kernel addresses outright (ie. kallsyms etc..). -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
