Since /proc entries varies at runtime, permission checks need to happen
during each system call.
However even with that /proc file descriptors can be passed to a more
privileged process (e.g. a suid-exec) which will pass the classic
ptrace_may_access() permission check. The open() call will be issued in
general by an unprivileged process while the disclosure of sensitive
/proc information will happen using a more privileged process at
read(),write()...
Therfore we need a more sophisticated check to detect if the cred of the
process have changed, and if the cred of the original opener that are
stored in the file->f_cred have enough permission to access the task's
/proc entries during read(), write()...
Add the proc_allow_access() function that will receive the file->f_cred
as an argument, and tries to check if the opener had enough permission
to access the task's /proc entries.
This function should be used with the ptrace_may_access() check.
Cc: Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org>
Suggested-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebied...@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tix...@opendz.org>
---
fs/proc/base.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
fs/proc/internal.h | 2 ++
2 files changed, 58 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index e834946..c29eeae 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -168,6 +168,62 @@ int proc_same_open_cred(const struct cred *fcred)
cap_issubset(cred->cap_permitted, fcred->cap_permitted));
}
+/* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */
+static int __proc_allow_access(const struct cred *cred,
+ struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ const struct cred *tcred;
+ const struct cred *fcred = cred;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ tcred = __task_cred(task);
+ if (uid_eq(fcred->uid, tcred->euid) &&
+ uid_eq(fcred->uid, tcred->suid) &&
+ uid_eq(fcred->uid, tcred->uid) &&
+ gid_eq(fcred->gid, tcred->egid) &&
+ gid_eq(fcred->gid, tcred->sgid) &&
+ gid_eq(fcred->gid, tcred->gid))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT)
+ ret = security_capable_noaudit(fcred, tcred->user_ns,
+ CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
+ else
+ ret = security_capable(fcred, tcred->user_ns,
+ CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
+
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return !ret ? ret : -EPERM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * proc_allow_access - Check if the file's opener had enough permissions
+ * to access the target process.
+ * @fcred: The file's opener cred (file->f_cred)
+ * @task: The target task we want to inspect
+ * @mode: The ptrace mode
+ *
+ * Return a non-zero if the file's opener had enough permissions to
+ * access the task's /proc entries.
+ *
+ * Since this function will check the permissions of the opener
+ * against the target task, it can be used to protect /proc files
+ * from opening a /proc file descriptor and do a suid-exec.
+ *
+ * Callers must hold the task->signal->cred_guard_mutex
+ */
+int proc_allow_access(const struct cred *fcred,
+ struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
+{
+ int ret;
+ task_lock(task);
+ ret = __proc_allow_access(fcred, task, mode);
+ task_unlock(task);
+ return !ret;
+}
+
/*
* Count the number of hardlinks for the pid_entry table, excluding the .
* and .. links.
diff --git a/fs/proc/internal.h b/fs/proc/internal.h
index e2459f4..c3f3c34 100644
--- a/fs/proc/internal.h
+++ b/fs/proc/internal.h
@@ -159,6 +159,8 @@ extern int proc_pid_statm(struct seq_file *, struct
pid_namespace *,
/*
* base.c
*/
+extern int proc_allow_access(const struct cred *,
+ struct task_struct *, unsigned int);
extern int proc_same_open_cred(const struct cred *);
extern const struct dentry_operations pid_dentry_operations;
extern int pid_getattr(struct vfsmount *, struct dentry *, struct kstat *);
--
1.7.11.7
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