[EMAIL PROTECTED] (H. Peter Anvin) wrote on 27.06.01 in
<9hd7pl$86f$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> By author: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Kai Henningsen)
> > [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Jorgen Cederlof) wrote on 27.06.01 in
> > <20010627014534.B2654@ondska>:
> >
> > > If we only allow user chroots for processes that have never been
> > > chrooted before, and if the suid/sgid bits won't have any effect under
> > > the new root, it should be perfectly safe to allow any user to chroot.
> >
> > Hmm. Dos this work with initrd and root pivoting?
> >
>
> At the moment, yes. Once Viro gets his root-changes in, this breaks,
> since ALL processes will be chrooted.
About what I expected. So you'd really want this flag to be resettable by
root, if you go that way at all. Beginning to look a little too compley, I
think.
The last time, ISTR we discussed some other, similar-but-different
syscalls that made for more secure jails. I don't quite remember the
details, though.
MfG Kai
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