[PATCH] asymmetric keys: explicitly add the leading zero byte to encoded message

[Lee, Chun-Yi]

From: Chun-Yi Lee <j...@suse.com>

Per PKCS1 spec, the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoded message is leading by 0x00 0x01 in
its first 2 bytes. The leading zero byte is suppressed by MPI so we pass a
pointer to the _preceding_ byte to RSA_verify() in original code, but it has
risk for the byte is not zero because it's not in EM buffer's scope, neither
RSA_verify() nor mpi_get_buffer() didn't take care the leading byte.

To avoid the risk, that's better we explicitly add the leading zero byte to EM
for pass to RSA_verify(). This patch allocate a _EM buffer to capture the
result from RSA_I2OSP(), then set the first byte to zero in EM and copy the
remaining bytes from _EM.

Cc: Rusty Russell <ru...@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Josh Boyer <jwbo...@redhat.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdun...@xenotime.net>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herb...@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <da...@davemloft.net>
Cc: David Howells <dhowe...@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chun-Yi Lee <j...@suse.com>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c |   14 ++++++++++----
 1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c
index ca1a4f3..7bc99d2 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsa.c
@@ -303,6 +303,7 @@ static int RSA_verify_signature(const struct public_key 
*key,
        /* Variables as per RFC3447 sec 8.2.2 */
        const u8 *H = sig->digest;
        u8 *EM = NULL;
+       u8 *_EM = NULL;
        MPI m = NULL;
        size_t k;
 
@@ -337,14 +338,19 @@ static int RSA_verify_signature(const struct public_key 
*key,
        /* (2c) Convert the message representative (m) to an encoded message
         *      (EM) of length k octets.
         *
-        *      NOTE!  The leading zero byte is suppressed by MPI, so we pass a
-        *      pointer to the _preceding_ byte to RSA_verify()!
+        *      NOTE!  The leading zero byte is suppressed by MPI, so we add it
+        *      back to EM before input to RSA_verify()!
         */
-       ret = RSA_I2OSP(m, k, &EM);
+       ret = RSA_I2OSP(m, k, &_EM);
        if (ret < 0)
                goto error;
 
-       ret = RSA_verify(H, EM - 1, k, sig->digest_size,
+       EM = kmalloc(k, GFP_KERNEL);
+       memset(EM, 0, 1);
+       memcpy(EM + 1, _EM, k-1);
+       kfree(_EM);
+
+       ret = RSA_verify(H, EM, k, sig->digest_size,
                         RSA_ASN1_templates[sig->pkey_hash_algo].data,
                         RSA_ASN1_templates[sig->pkey_hash_algo].size);
 
-- 
1.6.4.2

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