You then get into issues like: do we have to ban prelink as a result? Mimi Zohar <zo...@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
>On Thu, 2013-01-17 at 10:51 -0500, Vivek Goyal wrote: >> On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 10:37:01AM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote: >> > On Tue, 2013-01-15 at 16:34 -0500, Vivek Goyal wrote: >> > > If a binary is signed, verify its signature. If signature is not >valid, do >> > > not allow execution. If binary is not signed, execution is >allowed >> > > unconditionally. >> > > >> > > CONFIG_BINFMT_ELF_SIGNATURE controls whether elf binary signature >support >> > > is compiled in or not. >> > > >> > > Signature are expected to be present in elf section ".section". >This code >> > > is written along the lines of module signature verification code. >Just >> > > that I have removed the magic string. It is not needed as >signature is >> > > expected to be present in a specific section. >> > >> > Right, it's written along the lines of the original module >signature >> > verification code, where the signature was in the ELF header, not >the >> > version that was upstreamed, where the signature was appended. >> > >> > > I put the signature into a section, instead of appending it so >that >> > > strip operation works fine. >> > >> > Wouldn't the original reasons for not embedding the signature in >the ELF >> > header for modules apply here too? >> >> I think rusty wanted to append signatures. He thought it is much >easier. >> Adding a .signature section makes life easier for user space tools. >One >> can strip files even after signing. >> >> Not that I am married to the idea of putting signature in a section. >Just >> that it sounded reasonable enough to do for an RFC. So if appending >> signature proves to be better, it is easy to implement that. >> > >> > > One signs and verifies all the areas mapped by PT_LOAD segments >of elf >> > > binary. Typically Elf header is mapped in first PT_LOAD segment. >As adding >> > > .signature section can change three elf header fields (e_shoff, >e_shnum >> > > and e_shstrndx), these fields are excluded from digest >calculation >> > > >> > > Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgo...@redhat.com> >> > >> > At this point, why would you want yet another method for signing >files? >> >> Are you saying that append signature instead of putting them in a >section >> or are you saying that just use IMA. >> >> - For the first, I am fine with appending too if that works better. >So >> what's wrong with current implementation. Just because we append >the >> signatures in case of modules, we should follow the same thing for >> executables too? > >No, I was saying that if this patch set were to be upstreamed, then the >signature verification, at least for ELF modules and ELF executables, >should be the same. The patch would then be a lot smaller. > >> - If above comment is w.r.t use of IMA, then I have no issues in >using >> IMA as long as it can meet all the requirements. Looks like there >is >> a long TODO list before we get there. In fact for some things its >not >> even clear whether they fit in IMA or somehwere else. >> >> - Make sure IMA/EVM stuff chains into secureboot chain of trust. > >For sure. > >> - Sort out all the memory locking related issues I mentioned in >> other mail. You seemed to be of opinion that it is out of scope >> for IMA, but I think it probably is nice extenstion. > >Yes, it would be, but I'm not sure that your method of mmaping a file >with MAP_LOCKED is scalable, when all executables are signed. If it >is, >then why not do it in general? Otherwise there needs to be a more >scalable solution. > >> Or somehow a way needs to be found to make sure nobody can modify >> process address space without processe's knowledge. > >I'm not sure I understand. Does your patch already address this? > >> - Once all this works, then one needs to figure out all the RPM >stuff >> and plugins to make sure files can be singed on build server and >> installed properly on target system. > >Yes, we need the distros involvment in this to sign all files. >Immutable files should be signed with digital signatures. Mutable >files >should have hashes. > >thanks, > >Mimi -- Sent from my mobile phone. Please excuse brevity and lack of formatting. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/