The legacy 'fscrypt_direct_keys' table caches master keys that are used
by v1 encryption policies that have FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY.
It's just a global table for all filesystems (since the keys can be
provided by the legacy process-subscribed keyrings mechanism, which
makes it difficult to reuse super_block::s_master_keys).

The entries in it ('struct fscrypt_direct_key') do contain a super_block
pointer, though, for passing to fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() when
the last inode that references the key is evicted.

However, when finding the fscrypt_direct_key for an inode, we weren't
actually comparing the super_block pointer.  As a result, inodes with
different super_blocks could point to the same fscrypt_direct_key.  That
could extend the lifetime of a fscrypt_direct_key beyond the
super_block it points to, causing a use-after-free later.

Fix this by creating distinct fscrypt_direct_key structs for distinct
super_block structs.

Note that this problem doesn't exist in the v2 policy equivalent
("per-mode keys"), since the data structures there are per super_block.

Fixes: 22e9947a4b2b ("fscrypt: stop holding extra request_queue references")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
---
 fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c | 8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c b/fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c
index e6e527c73f167..7e3a58dc4b566 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c
@@ -147,13 +147,19 @@ find_or_insert_direct_key(struct fscrypt_direct_key 
*to_insert,
                if (memcmp(ci->ci_policy.v1.master_key_descriptor,
                           dk->dk_descriptor, FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) != 0)
                        continue;
+               /* The sb is used at eviction time, so it must be the same. */
+               if (ci->ci_inode->i_sb != dk->dk_sb)
+                       continue;
                if (ci->ci_mode != dk->dk_mode)
                        continue;
                if (!fscrypt_is_key_prepared(&dk->dk_key, ci))
                        continue;
                if (crypto_memneq(raw_key, dk->dk_raw, ci->ci_mode->keysize))
                        continue;
-               /* using existing tfm with same (descriptor, mode, raw_key) */
+               /*
+                * Use an existing prepared key with the same (descriptor, sb,
+                * mode, inlinecrypt, raw_key) combination.
+                */
                refcount_inc(&dk->dk_refcount);
                spin_unlock(&fscrypt_direct_keys_lock);
                free_direct_key(to_insert);

base-commit: f2ec6312bf711369561bdcb22f8a63c0b118c479
-- 
2.55.0


Reply via email to