Insert a nospec before the access to prevent it from ever using an index
that is subject to speculative scalar-confusion.
Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerho...@fau.de>
Acked-by: Henriette Herzog <henriette.her...@rub.de>
Cc: Maximilian Ott <o...@cs.fau.de>
Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.step...@fau.de>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 8093a5bac4d1..683a76aceffa 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -7858,6 +7858,11 @@ static int check_atomic(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn)
}
}
+static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
+{
+ return &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx];
+}
+
/* When register 'regno' is used to read the stack (either directly or through
* a helper function) make sure that it's within stack boundary and, depending
* on the access type and privileges, that all elements of the stack are
@@ -7897,18 +7902,18 @@ static int check_stack_range_initialized(
if (tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
min_off = max_off = reg->var_off.value + off;
} else {
- /* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for
+ /* Variable offset requires a nospec for unprivileged mode for
* simplicity since it requires corresponding support in
* Spectre masking for stack ALU.
* See also retrieve_ptr_limit().
*/
if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) {
- char tn_buf[48];
-
- tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
- verbose(env, "R%d variable offset stack access
prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\n",
- regno, tn_buf);
- return -EACCES;
+ /* Allow the access, but prevent it from using a
+ * speculative offset using a nospec before the
+ * dereference op.
+ */
+ cur_aux(env)->nospec = true;
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(cur_aux(env)->alu_state);
}
/* Only initialized buffer on stack is allowed to be accessed
* with variable offset. With uninitialized buffer it's hard to
@@ -11096,11 +11101,6 @@ static int check_get_func_ip(struct bpf_verifier_env
*env)
return -ENOTSUPP;
}
-static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
-{
- return &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx];
-}
-
static bool loop_flag_is_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
--
2.48.1
