Hi Chris-
> On Mar 19, 2021, at 10:54 AM, Chris Down <ch...@chrisdown.name> wrote:
>
> The reclen is taken directly from the first four bytes of the message
> with the highest bit stripped, which makes it ripe for protocol mixups.
> For example, if someone tries to send a HTTP GET request to us, we'll
> interpret it as a 1195725856-sized fragment (ie. (u32)'GET '), and print
> a ratelimited KERN_NOTICE with that number verbatim.
>
> This can be confusing for downstream users, who don't know what messages
> like "fragment too large: 1195725856" actually mean, or that they
> indicate some misconfigured infrastructure elsewhere.
One wonders whether that error message is actually useful at all.
We could, for example, turn this into a tracepoint, or just get
rid of it.
> To allow users to more easily understand and debug these cases, add the
> number interpreted as ASCII if all characters are printable:
>
> RPC: fragment too large: 1195725856 (ASCII "GET ")
>
> If demand grows elsewhere, a new printk format that takes a number and
> outputs it in various formats is also a possible solution. For now, it
> seems reasonable to put this here since this particular code path is the
> one that has repeatedly come up in production.
>
> Signed-off-by: Chris Down <ch...@chrisdown.name>
> Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.le...@oracle.com>
> Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfie...@redhat.com>
> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.mykleb...@hammerspace.com>
> Cc: David S. Miller <da...@davemloft.net>
> ---
> net/sunrpc/svcsock.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c b/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c
> index 2e2f007dfc9f..046b1d104340 100644
> --- a/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c
> +++ b/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c
> @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
> #include <linux/uaccess.h>
> #include <linux/highmem.h>
> #include <asm/ioctls.h>
> +#include <linux/ctype.h>
>
> #include <linux/sunrpc/types.h>
> #include <linux/sunrpc/clnt.h>
> @@ -863,6 +864,34 @@ static void svc_tcp_clear_pages(struct svc_sock *svsk)
> svsk->sk_datalen = 0;
> }
>
> +/* The reclen is taken directly from the first four bytes of the message with
> + * the highest bit stripped, which makes it ripe for protocol mixups. For
> + * example, if someone tries to send a HTTP GET request to us, we'll
> interpret
> + * it as a 1195725856-sized fragment (ie. (u32)'GET '), and print a
> ratelimited
> + * KERN_NOTICE with that number verbatim.
> + *
> + * To allow users to more easily understand and debug these cases, this
> + * function decodes the purported length as ASCII, and returns it if all
> + * characters were printable. Otherwise, we return NULL.
> + *
> + * WARNING: Since we reuse the u32 directly, the return value is not null
> + * terminated, and must be printed using %.*s with
> + * sizeof(svc_sock_reclen(svsk)).
> + */
> +static char *svc_sock_reclen_ascii(struct svc_sock *svsk)
> +{
> + u32 len_be = cpu_to_be32(svc_sock_reclen(svsk));
> + char *len_be_ascii = (char *)&len_be;
> + size_t i;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(len_be); i++) {
> + if (!isprint(len_be_ascii[i]))
> + return NULL;
> + }
> +
> + return len_be_ascii;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Receive fragment record header into sk_marker.
> */
> @@ -870,6 +899,7 @@ static ssize_t svc_tcp_read_marker(struct svc_sock *svsk,
> struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
> {
> ssize_t want, len;
> + char *reclen_ascii;
>
> /* If we haven't gotten the record length yet,
> * get the next four bytes.
> @@ -898,9 +928,14 @@ static ssize_t svc_tcp_read_marker(struct svc_sock *svsk,
> return svc_sock_reclen(svsk);
>
> err_too_large:
> - net_notice_ratelimited("svc: %s %s RPC fragment too large: %d\n",
> + reclen_ascii = svc_sock_reclen_ascii(svsk);
> + net_notice_ratelimited("svc: %s %s RPC fragment too large:
> %d%s%.*s%s\n",
> __func__, svsk->sk_xprt.xpt_server->sv_name,
> - svc_sock_reclen(svsk));
> + svc_sock_reclen(svsk),
> + reclen_ascii ? " (ASCII \"" : "",
> + (int)sizeof(u32),
> + reclen_ascii ?: "",
> + reclen_ascii ? "\")" : "");
> set_bit(XPT_CLOSE, &svsk->sk_xprt.xpt_flags);
> err_short:
> return -EAGAIN;
> --
> 2.30.2
>
--
Chuck Lever
