On Mon, 1 Mar 2021 09:20:15 -0800 Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 01, 2021, Kai Huang wrote:
> > +static int handle_encls_ecreate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > +{
> > +   struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *sgx_12_0, *sgx_12_1;
> > +   gva_t pageinfo_gva, secs_gva;
> > +   gva_t metadata_gva, contents_gva;
> > +   gpa_t metadata_gpa, contents_gpa, secs_gpa;
> > +   unsigned long metadata_hva, contents_hva, secs_hva;
> > +   struct sgx_pageinfo pageinfo;
> > +   struct sgx_secs *contents;
> > +   u64 attributes, xfrm, size;
> > +   u32 miscselect;
> > +   struct x86_exception ex;
> > +   u8 max_size_log2;
> > +   int trapnr, r;
> > +
> 
> (see below)
> 
> --- cut here --- >8
> 
> > +   sgx_12_0 = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 0);
> > +   sgx_12_1 = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 1);
> > +   if (!sgx_12_0 || !sgx_12_1) {
> > +           kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
> 
> This should probably be an emulation failure.  This code is reached iff SGX1 
> is
> enabled in the guest, userspace done messed up if they enabled SGX1 without
> defining CPUID.0x12.1.  That also makes it more obvious that burying this in a
> helper after a bunch of other checks isn't wrong, i.e. KVM has already 
> verified
> that SGX1 is enabled in the guest.

Agreed.

> 
> > +           return 1;
> > +   }
> 
> ---
> 
> > +
> > +   if (sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rbx_read(vcpu), 32, 32, &pageinfo_gva) 
> > ||
> > +       sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rcx_read(vcpu), 4096, 4096, &secs_gva))
> > +           return 1;
> > +
> > +   /*
> > +    * Copy the PAGEINFO to local memory, its pointers need to be
> > +    * translated, i.e. we need to do a deep copy/translate.
> > +    */
> > +   r = kvm_read_guest_virt(vcpu, pageinfo_gva, &pageinfo,
> > +                           sizeof(pageinfo), &ex);
> > +   if (r == X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT) {
> > +           kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault(vcpu, &ex);
> > +           return 1;
> > +   } else if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) {
> > +           sgx_handle_emulation_failure(vcpu, pageinfo_gva, size);
> > +           return 0;
> > +   }
> > +
> > +   if (sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, pageinfo.metadata, 64, 64, &metadata_gva) ||
> > +       sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, pageinfo.contents, 4096, 4096,
> > +                         &contents_gva))
> > +           return 1;
> > +
> > +   /*
> > +    * Translate the SECINFO, SOURCE and SECS pointers from GVA to GPA.
> > +    * Resume the guest on failure to inject a #PF.
> > +    */
> > +   if (sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, metadata_gva, false, &metadata_gpa) ||
> > +       sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, contents_gva, false, &contents_gpa) ||
> > +       sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, secs_gva, true, &secs_gpa))
> > +           return 1;
> > +
> > +   /*
> > +    * ...and then to HVA.  The order of accesses isn't architectural, i.e.
> > +    * KVM doesn't have to fully process one address at a time.  Exit to
> > +    * userspace if a GPA is invalid.
> > +    */
> > +   if (sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, metadata_gpa, &metadata_hva) ||
> > +       sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, contents_gpa, &contents_hva) ||
> > +       sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, secs_gpa, &secs_hva))
> > +           return 0;
> > +   /*
> > +    * Copy contents into kernel memory to prevent TOCTOU attack. E.g. the
> > +    * guest could do ECREATE w/ SECS.SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY=0, and
> > +    * simultaneously set SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY to bypass the check to
> > +    * enforce restriction of access to the PROVISIONKEY.
> > +    */
> > +   contents = (struct sgx_secs *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
> > +   if (!contents)
> > +           return -ENOMEM;
> 
> --- cut here --- >8
> 
> > +
> > +   /* Exit to userspace if copying from a host userspace address fails. */
> > +   if (sgx_read_hva(vcpu, contents_hva, (void *)contents, PAGE_SIZE))
> 
> This, and every failure path below, will leak 'contents'.  The easiest thing 
> is
> probably to wrap everything in "cut here" in a separate helper.  The CPUID
> lookups can be , e.g.
> 
>       contents = (struct sgx_secs *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
>       if (!contents)
>               return -ENOMEM;
> 
>       r = __handle_encls_ecreate(vcpu, &pageinfo, secs);
> 
>       free_page((unsigned long)contents);
>       return r;
> 
> And then the helper can be everything below, plus the CPUID lookup:
> 
>       sgx_12_0 = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 0);
>       sgx_12_1 = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 1);
>       if (!sgx_12_0 || !sgx_12_1) {
>               vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
>               vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION;
>               vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 0;
>               return 0;
>       }
> 

Hmm.. Obviously I wasn't careful enough. Thanks for pointing out.

Will do in your way.

> 
> > +           return 0;
> > +
> > +   miscselect = contents->miscselect;
> > +   attributes = contents->attributes;
> > +   xfrm = contents->xfrm;
> > +   size = contents->size;
> > +
> > +   /* Enforce restriction of access to the PROVISIONKEY. */
> > +   if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.sgx_provisioning_allowed &&
> > +       (attributes & SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY)) {
> > +           if (sgx_12_1->eax & SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY)
> > +                   pr_warn_once("KVM: SGX PROVISIONKEY advertised but not 
> > allowed\n");
> > +           kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
> > +           return 1;
> > +   }
> > +
> > +   /* Enforce CPUID restrictions on MISCSELECT, ATTRIBUTES and XFRM. */
> > +   if ((u32)miscselect & ~sgx_12_0->ebx ||
> > +       (u32)attributes & ~sgx_12_1->eax ||
> > +       (u32)(attributes >> 32) & ~sgx_12_1->ebx ||
> > +       (u32)xfrm & ~sgx_12_1->ecx ||
> > +       (u32)(xfrm >> 32) & ~sgx_12_1->edx) {
> > +           kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
> > +           return 1;
> > +   }
> > +
> > +   /* Enforce CPUID restriction on max enclave size. */
> > +   max_size_log2 = (attributes & SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT) ? sgx_12_0->edx >> 8 :
> > +                                                       sgx_12_0->edx;
> > +   if (size >= BIT_ULL(max_size_log2))
> > +           kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
> > +
> > +   pageinfo.metadata = metadata_hva;
> > +   pageinfo.contents = (u64)contents;
> > +
> > +   r = sgx_virt_ecreate(&pageinfo, (void __user *)secs_hva, &trapnr);
> > +
> > +   free_page((unsigned long)contents);
> > +
> > +   if (r)
> > +           return sgx_inject_fault(vcpu, secs_gva, trapnr);
> > +
> > +   return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
> 
> ---
> 
> > +}
> > +
> >  static inline bool encls_leaf_enabled_in_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 
> > leaf)
> >  {
> >     if (!enable_sgx || !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX))
> > @@ -41,6 +286,8 @@ int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> >     } else if (!sgx_enabled_in_guest_bios(vcpu)) {
> >             kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
> >     } else {
> > +           if (leaf == ECREATE)
> > +                   return handle_encls_ecreate(vcpu);
> >             WARN(1, "KVM: unexpected exit on ENCLS[%u]", leaf);
> >             vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN;
> >             vcpu->run->hw.hardware_exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_ENCLS;
> > -- 
> > 2.29.2
> > 

Reply via email to