Quoting Serge E. Hallyn ([EMAIL PROTECTED]):
> Quoting Serge E. Hallyn ([EMAIL PROTECTED]):
> > Quoting Casey Schaufler ([EMAIL PROTECTED]):
> > >
> > > --- Jiri Slaby <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > >
> > > > On 11/28/2007 12:41 PM, Andrew Morton wrote:
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > ftp://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/people/akpm/patches/2.6/2.6.24-rc3/2.6.24-rc3-mm2/
> > > > [...]
> > > > > +capabilities-introduce-per-process-capability-bounding-set.patch
> > > >
> > > > A regression against -mm1. This patch breaks bind (9.5.0-18.a7.fc8):
> > > > capset(0x19980330, 0,
> > > >
> > > {CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH|CAP_SETGID|CAP_SETUID|CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE|CAP_SYS_CHROOT|CAP_SYS_RESOURCE,
> > > >
> > > CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH|CAP_SETGID|CAP_SETUID|CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE|CAP_SYS_CHROOT|CAP_SYS_RESOURCE,
> > > > 0}) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted)
> > > >
> > > > $ grep SEC .config
> > > > CONFIG_SECCOMP=y
> > > > # CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK is not set
> > > > CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5=m
> > > > # CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_SPKM3 is not set
> > > > # CONFIG_SECURITY is not set
> > > > # CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is not set
> > > >
> > > > probably this hunk?:
> > > > @@ -133,6 +119,12 @@ int cap_capset_check (struct task_struct
> > > > /* incapable of using this inheritable set */
> > > > return -EPERM;
> > > > }
> > > > + if (!!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
> > > > + cap_combine(target->cap_inheritable,
> > > > + current->cap_bset))) {
> > > > + /* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */
> > > > + return -EPERM;
> > > > + }
> >
> > That shouldn't be it, since you can't lower cap_bset since
> > CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=n.
>
> Hmm, but sure enough that appears to be it.
>
> Still trying to figure out why.
No. Seriously. You're kidding me.
Patch attached :(
Thanks for spotting this, Jiri. I don't know where I introduced this
since I thought all my tests had passed...
thanks,
-serge
>From 70d5da610fdbd66a36886c01e27b7fb11d2de044 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED](none)>
Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2007 16:16:23 -0800
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] capabilities: correct logic at capset_check
Fix typo at capset_check introduced with capability bounding set
patch.
Signed-off-by: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED](none)>
---
security/commoncap.c | 2 +-
1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index c25ad09..503e958 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ int cap_capset_check (struct task_struct *target,
kernel_cap_t *effective,
/* incapable of using this inheritable set */
return -EPERM;
}
- if (!!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
+ if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
cap_combine(target->cap_inheritable,
current->cap_bset))) {
/* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */
--
1.5.1
-
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