Quoting Serge E. Hallyn ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): > Quoting Casey Schaufler ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): > > > > --- Jiri Slaby <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > On 11/28/2007 12:41 PM, Andrew Morton wrote: > > > > > > > > > ftp://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/people/akpm/patches/2.6/2.6.24-rc3/2.6.24-rc3-mm2/ > > > [...] > > > > +capabilities-introduce-per-process-capability-bounding-set.patch > > > > > > A regression against -mm1. This patch breaks bind (9.5.0-18.a7.fc8): > > > capset(0x19980330, 0, > > > > > {CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH|CAP_SETGID|CAP_SETUID|CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE|CAP_SYS_CHROOT|CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, > > > > > CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH|CAP_SETGID|CAP_SETUID|CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE|CAP_SYS_CHROOT|CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, > > > 0}) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted) > > > > > > $ grep SEC .config > > > CONFIG_SECCOMP=y > > > # CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK is not set > > > CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5=m > > > # CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_SPKM3 is not set > > > # CONFIG_SECURITY is not set > > > # CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is not set > > > > > > probably this hunk?: > > > @@ -133,6 +119,12 @@ int cap_capset_check (struct task_struct > > > /* incapable of using this inheritable set */ > > > return -EPERM; > > > } > > > + if (!!cap_issubset(*inheritable, > > > + cap_combine(target->cap_inheritable, > > > + current->cap_bset))) { > > > + /* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */ > > > + return -EPERM; > > > + } > > That shouldn't be it, since you can't lower cap_bset since > CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=n.
Hmm, but sure enough that appears to be it. Still trying to figure out why. thanks, -serge - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
