On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 03:41:40PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 03:33:52PM -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> > On Sun, 19 Apr 2020 12:08:48 +0200 gli...@google.com wrote:
> >
> > > KMSAN reported uninitialized data being written to disk when dumping
> > > core. As a result, several kilobytes of kmalloc memory may be written to
> > > the core file and then read by a non-privileged user.
>
> Ewww. That's been there for 12 years. Did something change in
> regset_size() or regset->get()? Do you know what leaves the hole?
>
> > >
> > > ...
> > >
> > > --- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c
> > > +++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
> > > @@ -1733,7 +1733,7 @@ static int fill_thread_core_info(struct
> > > elf_thread_core_info *t,
> > > (!regset->active || regset->active(t->task, regset) > 0)) {
> > > int ret;
> > > size_t size = regset_size(t->task, regset);
> > > - void *data = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> > > + void *data = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> > > if (unlikely(!data))
> > > return 0;
> > > ret = regset->get(t->task, regset,
> >
> > This seems to be a quite easy way of exposing quite a large amount of
> > kernel memory contents, so I think I'll add a cc:stable to this patch?
>
> Yes please.
>
> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org>
This has been in -next for a while, but we need to get this landed and
into -stable. Can you please send this to Linus for the final release? I
know Al is working on getting the complementary fixes landed too, but
this fix is also sufficient, trivial to backport, and provides some
future-proofing/defense in depth.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
