On Fri, 21 Dec 2018 12:56:27 -0500
Steven Rostedt <rost...@goodmis.org> wrote:
> From: Michael Ellerman <m...@ellerman.id.au>
>
> Currently seq_buf_puts() will happily create a non null-terminated
> string for you in the buffer. This is particularly dangerous if the
> buffer is on the stack.
>
> For example:
>
> char buf[8];
> char secret = "secret";
> struct seq_buf s;
>
> seq_buf_init(&s, buf, sizeof(buf));
> seq_buf_puts(&s, "foo");
> printk("Message is %s\n", buf);
>
> Can result in:
>
> Message is fooªªªªªsecret
Sending this via quilt, and that we have non UTF8 characters causes
LKML to blow up.
There's a couple more patches with this issue. I'm going to fix up the
change logs and rebase them.
-- Steve
>
> We could require all users to memset() their buffer to zero before
> use. But that seems likely to be forgotten and lead to bugs.
>
> Instead we can change seq_buf_puts() to always leave the buffer in a
> null-terminated state.
>
> The only downside is that this makes the buffer 1 character smaller
> for seq_buf_puts(), but that seems like a good trade off.
>
> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181019042109.8064-1-...@ellerman.id.au
>
> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org>
> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <m...@ellerman.id.au>
> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rost...@goodmis.org>
> ---
> lib/seq_buf.c | 6 +++++-
> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/lib/seq_buf.c b/lib/seq_buf.c
> index 11f2ae0f9099..6aabb609dd87 100644
> --- a/lib/seq_buf.c
> +++ b/lib/seq_buf.c
> @@ -144,9 +144,13 @@ int seq_buf_puts(struct seq_buf *s, const char *str)
>
> WARN_ON(s->size == 0);
>
> + /* Add 1 to len for the trailing null byte which must be there */
> + len += 1;
> +
> if (seq_buf_can_fit(s, len)) {
> memcpy(s->buffer + s->len, str, len);
> - s->len += len;
> + /* Don't count the trailing null byte against the capacity */
> + s->len += len - 1;
> return 0;
> }
> seq_buf_set_overflow(s);
