There is only one code path that can generate a pkuerr signal.  That
code path calls __bad_area_nosemaphore and can be dectected by testing
if si_code == SEGV_PKUERR.  It can be seen from inspection that all of
the other tests in fill_sig_info_pkey are unnecessary.

Therefore call force_sig_pkuerr directly from __bad_area_semaphore
and remove fill_sig_info_pkey.

At the same time move the comment above force_sig_info_pkey into
bad_area_access_error, so that the documentation of about pkey
generation races is not lost.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebied...@xmission.com>
---
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 75 ++++++++++++++-------------------------------
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index 11a93f14a674..ccfeed902eee 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -153,56 +153,6 @@ is_prefetch(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long 
error_code, unsigned long addr)
        return prefetch;
 }
 
-/*
- * A protection key fault means that the PKRU value did not allow
- * access to some PTE.  Userspace can figure out what PKRU was
- * from the XSAVE state, and this function fills out a field in
- * siginfo so userspace can discover which protection key was set
- * on the PTE.
- *
- * If we get here, we know that the hardware signaled a X86_PF_PK
- * fault and that there was a VMA once we got in the fault
- * handler.  It does *not* guarantee that the VMA we find here
- * was the one that we faulted on.
- *
- * 1. T1   : mprotect_key(foo, PAGE_SIZE, pkey=4);
- * 2. T1   : set PKRU to deny access to pkey=4, touches page
- * 3. T1   : faults...
- * 4.    T2: mprotect_key(foo, PAGE_SIZE, pkey=5);
- * 5. T1   : enters fault handler, takes mmap_sem, etc...
- * 6. T1   : reaches here, sees vma_pkey(vma)=5, when we really
- *          faulted on a pte with its pkey=4.
- */
-static void fill_sig_info_pkey(int si_signo, int si_code, siginfo_t *info,
-               u32 *pkey)
-{
-       /* This is effectively an #ifdef */
-       if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
-               return;
-
-       /* Fault not from Protection Keys: nothing to do */
-       if ((si_code != SEGV_PKUERR) || (si_signo != SIGSEGV))
-               return;
-       /*
-        * force_sig_info_fault() is called from a number of
-        * contexts, some of which have a VMA and some of which
-        * do not.  The X86_PF_PK handing happens after we have a
-        * valid VMA, so we should never reach this without a
-        * valid VMA.
-        */
-       if (!pkey) {
-               WARN_ONCE(1, "PKU fault with no VMA passed in");
-               info->si_pkey = 0;
-               return;
-       }
-       /*
-        * si_pkey should be thought of as a strong hint, but not
-        * absolutely guranteed to be 100% accurate because of
-        * the race explained above.
-        */
-       info->si_pkey = *pkey;
-}
-
 static void
 force_sig_info_fault(int si_signo, int si_code, unsigned long address,
                     struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *pkey)
@@ -215,8 +165,6 @@ force_sig_info_fault(int si_signo, int si_code, unsigned 
long address,
        info.si_code    = si_code;
        info.si_addr    = (void __user *)address;
 
-       fill_sig_info_pkey(si_signo, si_code, &info, pkey);
-
        force_sig_info(si_signo, &info, tsk);
 }
 
@@ -884,6 +832,9 @@ __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long 
error_code,
                tsk->thread.error_code  = error_code;
                tsk->thread.trap_nr     = X86_TRAP_PF;
 
+               if (si_code == SEGV_PKUERR)
+                       force_sig_pkuerr((void __user *)address, *pkey);
+
                force_sig_info_fault(SIGSEGV, si_code, address, tsk, pkey);
 
                return;
@@ -949,6 +900,26 @@ bad_area_access_error(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long 
error_code,
         * if pkeys are compiled out.
         */
        if (bad_area_access_from_pkeys(error_code, vma)) {
+               /*
+                * A protection key fault means that the PKRU value did not 
allow
+                * access to some PTE.  Userspace can figure out what PKRU was
+                * from the XSAVE state.  This function captures the pkey from
+                * the vma and passes it to userspace so userspace can discover
+                * which protection key was set on the PTE.
+                *
+                * If we get here, we know that the hardware signaled a 
X86_PF_PK
+                * fault and that there was a VMA once we got in the fault
+                * handler.  It does *not* guarantee that the VMA we find here
+                * was the one that we faulted on.
+                *
+                * 1. T1   : mprotect_key(foo, PAGE_SIZE, pkey=4);
+                * 2. T1   : set PKRU to deny access to pkey=4, touches page
+                * 3. T1   : faults...
+                * 4.    T2: mprotect_key(foo, PAGE_SIZE, pkey=5);
+                * 5. T1   : enters fault handler, takes mmap_sem, etc...
+                * 6. T1   : reaches here, sees vma_pkey(vma)=5, when we really
+                *           faulted on a pte with its pkey=4.
+                */
                u32 pkey = vma_pkey(vma);
                __bad_area(regs, error_code, address, &pkey, SEGV_PKUERR);
        }
-- 
2.17.1

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