Hi! > >What you do with AppArmor, instead of addressing the problem, is just > >redefine the environment along the lines of "set your house into a rock > >wall so there is only one path to it". > > Harrumph. Those analogies sound good but aren't a very good guide. > > Let's take a concrete example. Consider the following fragment of a > policy for Mozilla: > allow ~/.mozilla > deny ~ > Ignore the syntax; the goal is to allow Mozilla to access files under > ~/.mozilla but nothing else under my home directory. This is a perfectly > reasonable policy fragment to want to enforce. And enforcing it in > the obvious way using pathname-based access control is not a ridiculous > thing to do.
Unfortunately, mozilla needs temporary files IIRC. And when you add allow /tmp to your config files, you get system where your fellow users can ln HOME/.ssh/identity /tmp/to-steal (or ln HOME/.profile /tmp/put-evil-code-here) and AA protection is not effective any more. Would _you_ do this mistake? Would our users do this mistake? Is it right to provide them with auto-learning tools to make this mistake really easy? -- (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
