On Sat, 9 Jun 2007 11:01:41 +0900 Tetsuo Handa <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>From the discussion so far, it seems that the different "model" that AA is trying to implement, is to do in one step what SELinux does in two steps; that is trying to combine labelling and enforcement into a single step. If this is so, then why can't it just feed its automatic labelling into SELinux enforcement code? > I tried to give each file it's own label, but I couldn't do it. > http://sourceforge.jp/projects/tomoyo/document/nsf2003-en.pdf That paper seems entirely focused on the automatic generation of policy, and doesn't seem to help the discussion along. For instance, there may be a way to implement AA on top of SELinux _without_ giving each and every file its own label. > There are many elements that forms too strong barrier between pathname and > labels, > such as bind-mounts, hard links, newly created files, renamed files, > temporary files and so on. > So I gave up giving each file a label that can be used as an identifier, > and took an approach to forbid unneeded mount operations, unneeded link > operations, > unneeded renaming operations to keep the pathname represent it's own > identifier as much as possible. AA must have a function that decides the security rights for any given path in order to make its enforcement decisions. It must surely be able to deal with all those things you listed above (bind-mounts,hard links etc). So why can't those decisions be turned into labels that are fed into SELinux enforcement code? Sean. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
