Use PSCI based mitigation for speculative execution attacks targeting the branch predictor. We use the same mechanism as the one used for Cortex-A CPUs, we expect the PSCI version call to have a side effect of clearing the BTBs.
Signed-off-by: Jayachandran C <jn...@caviumnetworks.com> --- arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index 70e5f18..45ff9a2 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -338,6 +338,16 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = { .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BP_POST_GUEST_EXIT, MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1), }, + { + .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_BRCM_VULCAN), + .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening, + }, + { + .capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR, + MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CAVIUM_THUNDERX2), + .enable = enable_psci_bp_hardening, + }, #endif { } -- 2.7.4